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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, various uses of erecting a simple restriction to international capital 
mobility are investigated based on a North-South overlapping generation model. As an 
asymmetric information problem exists in our framework, taxation barriers to 
international capital mobility are justified to be appropriate to pursue various purposes. 
These purposes include: (i) stabilizing southern GDP, (ii) targeting at a certain steady 
state, (iii) inducing worldwide optimal path and (iv) precluding poverty trap. The 
consequences and properties of the barriers for various purposes are investigated in 
details. For instance, from the worldwide point of view, we have derived the optimal 
barriers in term of aggregate welfare, but such barriers are harmful to northern GDP. 
On the other hand, we point out which types of barriers can improve both southern and 
northern long-run GDP and welfare. For the barriers to be incentive compatible to both 
countries in the immediate run, different schemes of international cooperation on the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In this thesis, we conduct a policy analysis on barriers to international capital mobility 
for developing countries' concern. In particular, our analysis is based on a framework 
with moral hazard in financial contracts. 
First of all, our analysis is motivated by several well-known perverse phenomena 
emerged in international capital markets. Firstly, the capital often flows from capital-
poor developing countries to capital-rich developed countries when international capital 
mobility is unrestricted. For example, massive capital flight emerged in several Latin 
American countries during 1970s and 1980s. Capital flight is even a widespread 
phenomenon among developing countr ies�Moreover, f om 1984, with the exception of 
brief periods (such as 1990-96), developing countries were net lenders to the more 
developed countries. 2 Secondly, wealthier countries tend to experience higher real 
interest rates than poor countries.^ For example, the U.S. Treasury Bill rate was much 
higher than real interest rates in developing countries except for a short episode between 
1967 and 1985.4 These puzzling observations apparently contradict the predictions of 
the standard two-factor neoclassical growth model. Indeed, the perverse phenomena 
lead to an inefficiency in international allocation of funds and the non-convergence of 
international per-capita income levels. As a result, the unrestricted international capital 
1 According to a report by World Bank (1993)，in 1990 flight capital accounted for 80.3% of GDP in sub-
Saharan Africa, 94.9% in Middle East and North Africa, and 30.8% in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
2 See the Human Development Report 1992, table 4-3，and the World Economic Outlook, May 1999. 
3 See McKinnon (1973，1991) and Fry (1995). 
4 See World Development Report 1989. 
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mobility particularly acts to the detriment of long-term development in the developing 
countries.^ 
Observing the aforementioned perverse phenomena, although capital market 
globalization has been a trend during 1980's and 1990,s, it is worth to rethink the 
desirability of unrestricted international capital flows. In fact, concerning to the impacts 
of financial crisis emerging in Latin America and Asia in the late 1990's, advocating 
various international barriers, at least in certain circumstances, is recently common. For 
the sake of the long-term development of developing countries as well as the efficiency 
in a worldwide sense, we follow this line to rectify, at least partially, the problems in the 
capital market. Thus, we investigate analytically the uses and associated effects of 
various types of simple barriers to capital flows. 
In order to rectify the perverse phenomena, we must firstly identify the problems leading 
to the phenomena. In other words, we must be able to explain the international 
differentials of real interest rates and the perverse capital flows. In particular, we 
highlight two analytical approaches commonly adopted to provide the explanation. One 
of the approaches is so-called the property-right approach. For instance, Tomell and 
Velasco (1992) adopt this approach to explain the phenomena. They claim that when 
property rights over productive assets are poorly defined or cannot be enforced in the 
developing countries, citizens tend to make investments abroad through capital flight so 
5 According to Rodrik (1989)，the capital flight from developing countries has often been associated with 
low domestic investment and slow growth. 
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as to enjoy private access. ^ 
Another approach is so-called the information-structure approach. For example, Boyd 
and Smith (1997) explain the phenomena by the costly state verification problem, of the 
type introduced by Townsend (1979). They consider an environment in which the 
problem leads to credit rationing; and they show that poor countries are net lenders to 
rich countries eventually if international borrowing and lending are allowed. As a result， 
opening international capital markets tends to make initially poor countries poor 
permanently. As another example, Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001) provide their 
explanation by considering another type of information asymmetry that exists between 
individual lenders and borrowers. To be more specific, the information asymmetry, 
developed by Gertler and Rogoff (1990), leads to borrowers' moral hazard on 
investment allocation between the verifiable profit and the unverifiable one. As a result, 
interest rate in developing countries becomes lower than a normal level. Capital 
outflows from developing countries arise as a rational response to the information 
asymmetry if capital movements are not restricted. Thus, international convergence of 
income level is precluded. 
However, although various frameworks are available to provide the explanation of the 
perverse capital flows, there is relatively little literature conducting a policy analysis for 
reducing (or even eliminating) the adverse effects of the perverse capital flows, in the 
6 Relevant literature includes Gordon (1954)，Lancaster (1973), Levhari and Mirman (1980), Benhabib 
and Radner (1992), Lane and Tomell (1996)，and Tomell (1997). 
7 Relevant literature includes Atkeson (1988), Beraanke and Gertler (1989), Marcet and Marimon (1992), 
Galor and Zeira (1993)，Banerjee and Newman (1993)，and Ma and Smith (1996). 
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way of the analytical frameworks. Among the literature for such a policy analysis, 
Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000) analyze the uses and effects of simple barriers to 
capital mobility based on the framework analyzed in Boyd and Smith (1997), in which 
costly state verification problem exists. They find that barriers to capital flows can be 
used by developing countries, for stabilizing their GDP, to eliminate short-term 
economic volatility and enhance their economic development in both the short and long 
run. Meanwhile, the barriers are not necessarily harmful to other countries' 
development. 
We mainly follow the approach of Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000) to reexamine 
the policy implications of international barriers, but within a different framework. 
Specifically, our analysis is based on the framework analyzed in Sakuragawa and 
Hamada (2001) to take several advantages over the framework of Boyd and Smith 
(1997). Firstly, as we have briefly mentioned, Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001) explain 
the perverse capital movements by the presence of asymmetric information problem in 
the developing countries. We can analyze the nature of the asymmetric information 
problem to justify the erection of simple restriction to capital mobility. Secondly, the 
framework of Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001) can explicitly analyze the global 
dynamic pattern of the world economy, whereas that of Boyd and Smith (1997) conducts 
a local dynamic analysis around any steady state. This limitation of the latter 
Q 
framework confines the analysis of time-invarying barrier policy in Espinosa-Vega, 
Smith and Yip (2000)，at least with respect to its effect on global dynamics. Thirdly, the 
framework of Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001) captures the feature of "poverty trap" 
4 
which we want to preclude by barriers. 
In this thesis, we study issues that go beyond Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000). For 
example, we analyze three types of barriers, namely, fixing-southem-investment barriers, 
time-invarying barriers, and worldwide optimal barriers for various policy purposes, 
while the analysis of worldwide optimal barriers is not provided in Espinosa-Vega, 
Smith and Yip (2000). Moreover, in addition to the steady-state welfare analysis, we 
have an analysis on the "next-period welfare effects" for the immediate run. It is, we 
claim, important to the issue of incentive compatibility. 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces a dynamic 
North-South framework with asymmetric information problem for our further 
discussions. Chapter 3 analyzes the nature of the asymmetric information problem. 
Chapter 4 investigates the uses and effects of different types of barrier policy for various 
policy purposes. Chapter 5 examines the corresponding welfare effects. Finally, 
Chapter 6 is the epilogue. 
8 That is called as static barrier in Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000). 
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Chapter 2. The Model 
In this chapter, we introduce a dynamic two-country OLG model in which the financial 
contract between entrepreneurs and lenders is subject to asymmetric information 
problem. Our analytical framework follows Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001) very 
closely. 
2.1. Environment 
Consider a two-country world economy, populated by two-period lived overlapping 
generations, with intragenerational lending. In each country i (J = S, N where S denotes 
the South and N denotes the North), every generation is identical in size and 
composition, and contains a continuum of agents with unit mass. There is no population 
growth and agents cannot move between countries. Within each generation, there are 
two distinct classes of agents that one calls entrepreneurs and lenders. A fraction a of 
agents is an entrepreneur who has access to an investment project, whereas the 
remaining fraction 1-a is a lender who does not. Agents maximize the expected second-
period consumption because they are risk-neutral and care only about consuming in the 
second period. In addition, agents are protected by the limited liability constraint. 
Each lender in country i (i = S, N) receives W^ units of the consumption good in their 
young period t by supplying one unit of labor inelastically to the consumption-good 
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firm, where W,' is defined below. Lenders save all the first-period income by lending to 
others in order to realize the second-period consumption. By contrast, each entrepreneur 
receives no endowment in either period of their life but has access to one investment 
project when young. An investment project transforms consumption good into 
investment good as follows: x units of the consumption good invested yield 0 units of 
next-period investment good with probability n(x) and zero units with probability 
l-7r(;c) . The success probability 7i(-) is increasing, strictly concave, and twice 
continuously differentiable, satisfying 71 (0) = 0, tt (00) = 1, and n '(0) < 00 . Thus, the 
more consumption good invested into the project, the higher is the project's success 
probability, and the marginal expected return to investment is diminishing. We assume 
that returns realizations of investment projects are independently and identically 
distributed across entrepreneurs. 
In each country, the production of the consumption good takes two steps: First, 
investment projects operated by entrepreneurs transform the consumption good into the 
investment good, and second, competitive firms produce the consumption good by using 
labor and the investment good. Production of the investment good takes one period 
whereas that of the consumption good is instantaneous. The investment good 
depreciates fully in one period. The consumption good, which serves as the numeraire, 
is perishable between periods. The production technology for the consumption good is 
expressed by 
Y: = i K : y { N : y - ' ( k ; y - \ o < p < i (2.1) 
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where 7/ is the quantity of output in country i, is the quantity of investment good 
employed in country i, Nj is the work force in country i, k] = K] / N] the investment 
good per labor (or capital-labor ratio) in country i. Also, k', denotes the average of k;， 
and its presence in equation (2.1) represents positive spillovers to the productivity of the 
production function. Since the production technology is homogeneous of degree one for 
private inputs, output of the consumption good can be, without loss of generality, 
described in terms of the action of a single aggregate price-taking firm. All quantities 
are measured in per-capita unit, which equals the aggregate unit because population is 
standardized to unity. 
The rental market for investment good, the labor market, and the good market in each 
country are perfectly competitive. At equilibrium = k,' is satisfied. Let p; denotes 
the period t rental rate and W,' is the period t wage rate in country i. Then competitive 
factor markets yield 
P； = P (2.2) 
and W； (2.3) 
In a country either with or without asymmetric information problem, the success 
probability function of investment projects 7r(.) and the production technology for 
consumption good are common knowledge. For a country that has asymmetric 
information problem, the information structure of that country is essentially the same as 
that analyzed in Gertler and Rogoff (1990). Suppose that, with information asymmetry, 
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although lenders are able to observe the amount of loan obtained by each entrepreneur, 
they cannot observe the entrepreneur's allocation of funds. In particular, entrepreneurs 
may secretly invest the borrowed funds in the loan to other entrepreneurs rather than 
invest in their risky project. Each lender can verify the profit of an investment project 
funded directly by herself but cannot verify any other profits accruing to the borrower. 
Thus, in a country with asymmetric information problem, the existence of borrowers' 
private information on the allocation of funds creates a moral hazard problem. In 
contrast, in a country without the asymmetric information problem, lenders can verify 
any kind of profits made by entrepreneurs and thus no moral hazard problem emerges. 
The remainder of this chapter consists of two sections. Section 2.2 analyzes the autarkic 
equilibrium in cases of with and without the asymmetric information problem. In 
section 2.3，we assume that the South has the asymmetric information problem but the 
North does not and the two countries are identical except for the information structure 
and the initial per-capita income level. Then the equilibrium with unfettered 
international capital mobility is analyzed. 
2.2. Autarkic equilibrium 
Let us examine an equilibrium of a closed economy with asymmetric information 
problem, in which capital^ is not mobile internationally. We start by studying the 
contracting problem that exists between entrepreneurs and lenders. When an 
9 In this thesis, capital is not referred to investment good, but referred to loanable fund in term of 
consumption good. 
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entrepreneur bom at period t invests in her risky project, she must raise loans from 
lenders bom at t. Then the amount of loan funded must satisfy 
办；丨， (2-4) 
where b] is the amount of loans supplied to this entrepreneur in period t, and x；^, is the 
amount invested in risky project for a return realized in period ^+1. Since the output of 
the project is verifiable, the entrepreneur is able to write a contract contingent on the 
project return. The contract must compensate lenders for the market-determined gross 
interest rate r/^,, and hence the individual rationality (IR) condition for lenders is 
7r(x;+i)Z;_+[l-7r(x;_+,)]!2;=r/>;, (2.5) 
where Z\ is the payment when the project is successful, and Q\ is the payment when 
the project fails. The entrepreneur's expected profit is 
兀(x;+,)(ep — Z ; _ ) - [ l - • (2.6) 
The first two terms represent the expected profit from the project net of interest costs, 
and the third term represents the return from the loan to others. Since the borrower's 
choice for is neither observable nor verifiable, the contract must be structured so as 
to induce borrowers to reveal the choice of truthfully. Such an incentive 
compatibility (IC) condition implies 
= arg maxti - Z；) - [1 - t i )]2; + (b； - ) • (2.7) 
Suppose at this stage that 9p - (Z/ - 2,') > 0 , which allows the second-order condition 
for local uniqueness, 7r"0;+i)pp -(Z； - 0 ; ) ] < O , to be satisfied. Then the following 
first-order condition can replace equation (2.7): 
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兀 = ( 2 . 8 ) 
Finally, the payment in the bad state cannot exceed her second-period verifiable 
income, that is, ！2,' ^ 0. 
Each entrepreneur solves her optimization problem by maximizing her expected 
consumption subject to the loans sufficiency constraint (equation 2.4)，the IR condition 
for lenders (equation 2.5)，the IC constraint (equation 2.8), and the limited liability 
constraint < 0 . The optimal contract is specified by a triplet {x；'^,,Z；',} satisfying 
the following equations: 
IR (2.9) 
咖,+丨） 
IC 7rV;+丨)(ep-z;) = r二丨， (2.10) 
and Q： = 0 (2.11) 
given . Finally, it follows from equation (2.9)，(2.10), and (2.11) that 
e p - ( Z ; - g ; ) = ,•，〒+':, > 0 for any > 0 . 
Thus, the second-order condition associated with equation (2.7) must be satisfied. 
The market clearing condition for the loan market implies 
oa ;+ ,= ( l - a ) ( l -p )A: ; . (2.12) 
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The LHS of equation (2.12) is the aggregate demand for loans and the RHS is the 
aggregate supply of loans. The relationship between the aggregate investment good K] 
and the borrower's investment level x; is given by 
K； =aen(x；). (2.13) 
Using equation (2.12), (2.13) and the fact that X"； = (1 -a)k(，we derive the difference 
equation in x; for the dynamics: 
<,=(1-P)e7i(x；). (2.14) 
To ensure an interior steady state, the following technical assumption is imposed: 
Assumption 1. (1 - P )971 '(0) > 1. 
In a closed economy under asymmetric information, if assumption 1 is satisfied, a 
nontrivial equilibrium is a sequence {x;，/;'，Z;}二 satisfying equation (2.9), (2.10), and 
(2.14) given 4 > 0. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, there exists a unique nontrivial steady state that is globally 
stable. The other two variables evolve as 
_ 冗'OCi) (2 15) 
and r / + 丨 = e p ” ( 0 ， (2.16) 
啦 +丨 ) + � K (太,+丨） 
where r|(.) is defined by: 
• 兀 術 ） . (2.17) 
71 (x) + xn (X) 
12 
It is easy to show that r| '(•) < 0 � and both Z\ and r/^ , are monotone decreasing 
functions of . The unique nontrivial steady-state equilibrium is described as a triplet 
{jc, r , Z} satisfying 
7r ' (x ) (ep-Z) = r , 
Z = 五， 
71 (X) 
and jc = ( l -P)e7t( jc) . 
The analysis above studies an autarkic equilibrium of an economy with asymmetric 
information problem. In the following, we study alternatively an autarkic equilibrium of 
an economy without asymmetric information, which is much simpler than the analysis 
of the asymmetric information case. When the asymmetric information is absent, the 
interest payments to lenders can be directly claimed on the loan amounts h\. The 
borrowers are able to offer fixed interest payments to their lenders by entering 
appropriate insurance contracts. Thus the borrowers' (entrepreneurs') expected profits 
become: 
7r(x;+丨)ep +[l-7r(x;+丨)](0)-r/+i6;. -x；,.) 
Individual entrepreneurs will choose the investment level to satisfy 
ep7i'(x;_+,) = r/+,. (2.18) 
Then an equilibrium with symmetric information is characterized by a sequence 
{x;，r/}二。satisfying equations (2.14) and (2.18) given ；4 > 0 . In both cases, the 
See Appendix A for a proof. 
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dynamic behavior of x: is described by equation (2.14), and the only difference is 
reflected in the real interest rate. By comparing equation (2.16) and (2.18)，we find that 
the marginal return to capital is discounted by the factor n (x； ,^) /[ti (x； ,^ ) + '(->^ ,'+1)] 
(<1) in equation (2.16). Given the same value of x;，the interest rate under private 
information is strictly smaller than that under symmetric information. 
2.3. Equilibrium with unfettered international capital mobility 
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium with unfettered international capital mobility. 
Before proceeding, we suppose that the North is initially richer than the South. Labor is 
assumed to be internationally immobile whereas capital is mobile across countries. 
Moreover, we examine a world economy in which countries differ in the degree of 
asymmetric information. To make the analysis simple, let us assume that the South has 
the asymmetric information problem but the North does not. In other words, in the 
North, any kind of profits made by entrepreneurs can be verified by lenders, whereas in 
the South only the profit made by projects can be verified. This assumption is 
motivated by the fact that in developing countries, the enforcement system to secure 
property rights, the monitoring technology of banks, or accounting principles are often 
poorly developed. 
With unrestricted international borrowing and lending, the interest rate faced by lenders 
in each country must be equalized. Then, since the South have the asymmetric 
information problem but the North does not, the following equation is obtained 
14 
ep7r'(x;:,) = =ep”(xf+,) for a l l / > 0 , (2.19) 
where R,+�denote the world interest rate. It follows that 
71 '(X 广)=r| (jcf) for all / > 1 . (2.20) 
Since n "(•) < 0 holds, by the implicit function theorem, if there is a solution to equation 
(2.20), there exists a single-valued continuously differentiable function 
x � = ix(xf), (2.21) 
where ^i(xf) has the following properties: (1) |a '( .)>0, (2) ^ (xf ) >xf for any xf > 0 , 
and (3) | i (0 )>0 Moreover, the market-clearing condition for the world capital 
market, assemble to equation (2.14), is 
(1 一 p )e [71 ( x f ) + 71 (X,)] = + 4 . (2.22) 
In a two-country economy in which asymmetric information exists only in the South, if 
capital is mobile internationally, the equilibrium is described as a sequence {xf，x广广=� 
satisfying equations (2.21) and (2.22) given (x^, x ^ ) ( � 0 ) . 12 It is immediate to 
characterize steady-state equilibria. Any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium is a pair 
( j c � j c " ) under which 
Z = (2.23) 
and ( l - P ) e [ 7 i ( ? ) + 7 r ( ? ' ) ] = ? + 7 ' . (2.24) 
“ T h e proof for the property of the function |i(-) is provided in Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001) and we 
do not repeated here. 
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The properties of the locus satisfying equation (2.24) are discussed in Appendix B. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the dynamic process of (jcf . � T h e economy jumps to point B 
at period 1 and then converges to the steady state point C along the locus (2.21). 
Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001) showed that any steady state is associated with capital 
flows from the South to the North" Facing a higher foreign interest rate, southern 
lenders will substitute their funds from domestic to foreign lending. The associated 
change in the interest rates leads to a reduction of the investment level of the South and 
an increase in the investment level of the N o r t h . H o w e v e r , Sakuragawa and Hamada 
(2001) also illustrated that it is possible that capital flows from the North to the South at 
an early stage of development. When the South is poor, the South enjoys capital 
inflows, but as the South becomes richer, the South is likely to experience capital 
outflows. In conclusion, the world capital market can involve the reversal of the 
direction of capital movement between the North and the South during the developing 
process. 
When there is a difference in the degree of information asymmetry across countries, 
there may exist multiple steady states. In particular, if |a(0) > x holds, nontrivial 
12 Incorporating equation (2.21) into equation (2.22), we can trace the dynamic evolution of xf through a 
first-order difference equation of xf. Once the dynamic process of xf has been determined, that of x? is 
determined according to equation (2.21). For the details, see Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001). 
Figure 2.2 depicts the case where there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium. 
14 That is, > (1 - P)e7t(;c") and x ' < (1 - (3 )971 (;c勺.See Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001) for the 
proof. 
15 A good example of capital flight is found in the experience of several Latin American countries during 
1970s and 1980s. Cumby and Levich (1987), Cuddington (1987), and Dooley (1986) estimate that the 
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multiple steady-state equilibria are likely to emerge. Since then the capital level of the 
South eventually may be driven to zero, the arbitrage condition (equation 2.20) can be 
replaced by: 
7rXx,")=n(x,) if xf > 0 (2.25) 
and if jcf = 0 . (2.26) 
We obtain two different kinds of configurations on the dynamic process. Figure 2.2 
illustrates the case with a unique steady state in which the economy converges to point 
C, whereas Figure 2.3 illustrate the cases with multiple steady-state equilibria. Let H 
denote the "wealthy" steady-state equilibrium whose coordinate is 么）and L 
denote the "poor" steady state whose coordinate is ) . We obtain the following 
result: 
Lemma 1: Suppose that }^(0)> J holds and that there are two interior steady-state 
equilibria, (x力，x么）and ) , satisfying equations (2.23) and (2.24) and that 
> ；cf and > jcf . Then, if jc广 < x or xf < x广 < x二 , x广 monotone increases, 
whereas if x <jcf <xf or x广 monotone decreases�6 
Then we define a locus PQ satisfying (1 - P )9 [ti (xf) + 7t (xf) ] = xf + xf in the plane 
(jc严，x,") illustrated in Figure 2.3 and obtain the following. 
magnitude of capital flight was substantial from 1976 to 1984, especially in Argentina, Mexico, and 
Venezuela. 
16 This is Lemma 5 of Sakuragawa and Hamada. 
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Lemma 2: If and only if the initial state { XQ , XQ ) satisfies (1 - [3)0[ti(^f) + 7i(x,^)]< 
j c f ， t h e period 1 unfettered integrated state satisfies both jcf > xf and 
Lemmas 1 and 2 jointly imply that, in the case of multiple nontrivial steady states, 
equilibrium paths converge to different long-run states depending on different initial 
state. If the initial state lies in the northeast of the locus PQ, the economy can afford to 
jump to a point on the segment LV, converging to point H. Conversely, if the initial 
condition lies in the southwest of the curve PQ, the economy will jump to a point on the 
segment WL, eventually converging to the steady state where the South's national 
income is zero, given by (0, J ) . The problem is even more severe if the locus 
•x," = ) in the plane ( x f , x^) is completely above the locus of equation (2.24). 
Since then there exists no interior steady state. It is easy to see that the economy always 
converges to the steady state (0,3c) for any initial state. 
If the world economy is initially at the premature stage of development so that the world 
economy is poor, the North's demand for capital will bid up the world interest rate to the 
level at which southern lenders find it profitable to invest all their funds abroad. The 
difference in the agency costs of different countries leads to "complete" capital flight 
from the South to the North. The welfare effect of unfettered international capital 
mobility is detrimental to the South, which falls into the poverty trap. The above 
problem may even exist for any initial stage of development if the international 
difference in agency costs resulted by information asymmetry is too large. Conversely, 
17 This Lemma is very similar to Lemma 6 in Sakuragawa and Hamada. 
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according to the analysis of the autarkic equilibrium provided previously, there always 
exists a unique nontrivial globally stable steady state and thus poverty trap is always 
absent. 
In conclusion, in a world economy in which countries differ in the degree of asymmetric 
information, if the world economy is at the premature stage of development, the 
international capital mobility without any barrier can lead to capital flight and create 
poverty trap. Even if capital flight and poverty trap do not exist, capital must flow from 
the South to the North in steady state, leading to the non-convergence of international 
income levels. 
The possibility of the above perverse phenomena is based on the existence of 
asymmetric information problem. More specifically, the moral hazard problem in the 
financial market essentially results in the puzzle of capital mobility. One natural 
suggestion dealing with the problem is enhancing the law enforcement on the 
asymmetric information problem in developing countries. However, the central theme 
of this thesis does not concentrate on enforcing the borrowers' behaviors to alleviate the 
moral hazard problem, but to alter the lenders' rational behaviors. The latter will be 
discussed in details in the following chapters. In the next chapter, we analyze the nature 
of such an information asymmetry from a different point of view. After that, the 
analysis in the rest of this thesis will be based on a world economy with an international 
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Chapter 3. Regarding Asymmetric Information Problem 
as a Subsidy 
In the previous chapter, we have introduced a two-country North-South model in which 
the financial contract between entrepreneurs and lenders is subject to an asymmetric 
information problem. The North-South difference in the extent of such asymmetric 
information problem results in perverse phenomena. In this chapter, we analyze the 
nature of asymmetric information problem from a different point of view. In particular, 
we attempt to show that the asymmetric information problem can be regarded as a 
subsidy on income from foreign investment. In Section 3.1，we consider the open 
capital-market equilibrium without difference in the degree of asymmetric information. 
In Section 3.2, we add a subsidy to the case of Section 3.1 in order to simulate the case 
with differential degree in asymmetric information. 
3.1. Equilibrium without differential degree in asymmetric information 
In this section, we consider the open capital-market equilibrium without differential 
degree in asymmetric information so that the South and the North are identical except 
for the initial per-capita income level. Two cases are examined. In one case, we study a 
world economy where there is no asymmetric information problem, while in the other 
case we assume both countries share the same asymmetric information problems. To fix 
idea, we suppose as before that the North is initially richer than the South and labor is 
internationally immobile. 
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First of all, a country's information asymmetry affects that country's autarkic interest 
rate for a given investment level. As a result, the distribution of information asymmetry 
between the North and the South can affect the allocation of funds internationally. 
However, the aggregate demand for and supply of loans in the world capital market 
remain unaffected. Therefore, equation (2.22) is still the market-clearing condition for 
the world capital market in this chapter. 
In the case of no asymmetric information problem, equation (2.19) should be rewritten 
as 
= for i = S,N, (3.1) 
which implies 
7 rXx”=7r '0c , ) . (3.2) 
Whereas in the situation where both countries share the same asymmetric information 
problems, equation (2.19) should be rewritten as 
ep 冗 二 及 , + 丨 f o r / : 队 (3.3) 
which implies 
(3.4) 
where r|(.) is defined by equation (2.17). Since the LHS (RHS) of both equations (3.2) 
and (3.4) is a strictly decreasing function of xf (x广），in both cases, the following 
equation must be satisfied 
xf = x^ for all / > 1. (3.5) 
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In conclusion, in the cases of either both countries have no information asymmetry or 
both countries share the same asymmetric information problems, the equilibrium with 
an unfettered international capital market is described as a sequence 
satisfying equations (2.22) and (3.5) where (xf , X o " ) ( � 0 ) is given. It follows that, for 
/ > 1, X: (i = S,N) simply evolves as 
(1-P)e7i (x;) = <,, i = S,N, (3.6) 
where x； = (1 - (3)0 [ti (x^)+7i(x^)]/2, i = S, N. Therefore, by assumption 1, there 
exists a unique nontrivial globally stable steady-state equilibrium of which is 
the autarkic steady-state equilibrium (x, x ) . 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the dynamic process. The economy jumps to point B in period 1 
and then monotonically converges to the steady state point A. It should be noticed that 
capital may move internationally in period 0, but from period 1 the two countries' 
capital levels are equalized, and there is no incentive for capital flow. 
Finally, with respect to investment levels, the dynamic process is the same either when 
both countries have the asymmetric information problem at the same level or when both 
countries do not have the asymmetric information problem. It suggests that it is the 
RELATIVE degree of asymmetric information problem rather than the absolute degree 
that matters. However, it should be noted that the interest rate is higher in the case of no 
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asymmetric information problem. So the absolute degree of the information asymmetry 
still affects the wealth distribution between lenders and entrepreneurs. 
3.2. Simulating asymmetric information by a subsidy 
In this section, we show that by levying subsidy to the cases of zero differential degree 
in asymmetric information, we can simulate the case with the relative difference. In 
other words, we introduce a subsidization policy to the cases considered in the previous 
section in order to simulate the case considered in Section 2.3. The subsidization policy 
consists of a sequence of time-varying subsidies imposed on the gross interest income 
earned by southern residents in the North. The policy can be imposed by either southern 
or northern government and is financed by a lump-sum tax. For convenience, let us call 
such a subsidization policy as an asymmetric-information-equivalent (AIE) 
subsidization policy, and the associated subsidy as asymmetric-information-equivalent 
(AIE) subsidy. In the following, we will derive the AIE subsidy. 
Firstly, we assume that both countries have NO asymmetric information problem. To 
derive the AIE subsidy, we attempt to simulate the case where only the South has the 
asymmetric information problem. Considering the existence of a sequence of subsidies, 
the equation (3.2) should be restated as 
( l + a > ' ( J c , ^ ) = 7 i ' ( x f ) for all t > \ . (3.7) 
The sequence of the AIE subsidy rates, , should make the equation (2.20) 
equivalent to the equation (3.7). Thus, one can easily verify that should satisfies 
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a , for all / > 1, (3.8) 71 (X,) 
where xf solves equations (2.20) and (2.22) given x^ and x: . By the property of 
7i(.), we can show that 0 < a , <1 must hold. Thus, the case of only the South have 
asymmetric information problem can be simulated by the case where both countries 
have no asymmetric information problem and the gross interest income earned by 
southern residents in the North is subject to a sequence of subsidies stated in equation 
(3.8). 
Now, we alternatively assume that both countries have asymmetric information 
problem. Again, to derive the AIE subsidy, we need to simulate the case where only the 
South has asymmetric information problem. Considering the existence of a sequence of 
subsidies, the equation (3.4) should be restated as 
(1+C7,)r|(x,")=”“,） for a l l? > 1. (3.9) 
In this case, the sequence of the AIE subsidy rates, {a,}"^,, should make the equation 
(2.20) equivalent to the equation (3.9). Thus, one can easily verify that {a,}:, should 
satisfies 
xNn’（xN� 
0 = ' V for all / > 1 , (3.10) 
‘兀“,） 
where x广 solves equations (2.20) and (2.22) given x^ and x二 . Again, by the property 
of Tc (•)，we can show that 0 < cj, <1 must hold. Thus, the case of only the South have 
asymmetric information problem can also be simulated by the case where both countries 
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have asymmetric information problem and the gross interest income earned by southern 
18 residents in the North is subject to a sequence of subsidies stated in equation (3.10). 
In conclusion, the relative inefficiency in asymmetric information problem can be 
regarded as a subsidy encouragement on investment abroad. This motivates us to study 
the erection of a barrier to international capital mobility, which is "negative" subsidy, 
when differences in the relative degree of information asymmetry exists. 
18 The magnitudes of a / s in equations (3.8) and (3.10) are different since xf < x? . As xn ‘⑴/兀⑷ is 
not a monotone function in x, it is hard to compare the two magnitudes unless additional property of tt (•) 
is assumed. For example, we can show that if 冗(•) is a rectangular hyperbola, xk '{x)!^ {x) is a 
decreasing function in x, and hence the a, in equation (3.8) is greater than that in (3.10). One can see the 
relevant details in Section 4.5. 
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Chapter 4. Barrier as a Policy Instrument 
After analyzing the nature of the asymmetric information problem, we return to the case 
of our central concern, which is first examined in Section 2.3. In other words, we will 
analyze the equilibrium with international capital mobility, and we will assume only the 
South has asymmetric information problem. However, we introduce a barrier, rather 
than wholly unfettered, to international capital mobility in our analysis starting from this 
chapter. In this chapter, we will explore various implications of barrier policy to 
international capital mobility. 
4.1. Introduction to barrier policy 
As mentioned previously, the enforcement system to secure property rights, such as the 
monitoring technology of banks, or accounting principles in developing countries are 
often poorly developed compared to developed countries. This fact motivates and 
justifies our assumption that only the South has asymmetric information problem. 
However, once this assumption is imposed, the world economy would often experience 
a perverse capital flow (at least in the steady state). As a result, the international 
allocation of funds is not optimal, and even poverty trap may be possibly created. The 
perverse phenomena are attributable to the difference in degree of asymmetric 
information problem. Besides, as stated in Chapter 3, the asymmetric information 
problem can be regarded as a time sequence of subsidies on southern capital outflow. 
Thus, erecting barriers to international capital mobility, which are "negative" subsidies, 
30 
is considered to be an appropriate way to adjust the degree of asymmetric information 
problem. 19 
Now, suppose a proportional tax (or an equivalent quota) is imposed on the interest 
income earned by southern residents in the North in period 1, 2, .... The tax can be 
levied by either the southern or northern government and the revenues collected are 
rebated to old agents as a lump-sum at each date. Under our assumptions, such rebates 
do not affect the equilibrium conditions of our model. Let x, denote the tax rate in 
period t {t = 1,2, ...). Since southern residents must be indifferent between lending 
internationally and lending domestically, the following condition must hold in order for 
after-tax real returns to be equated. 
舅 》 ( 1 - � “ 1 % S : S S ) f o r a l " ” . (4.1) 
It follows that 
(1 -T> ' (x：) 二 广 ; (产 ( y ”“,) for a l W > l . (4.2) 
where ri(-) is defined by equation (2.17). Besides, the aggregate demand for and supply 
of loans in the world capital market are not affected, equation (2.22) remains to be the 
market-clearing condition for the world capital market. Equations (4.2) and (2.22), 
given (jCQ ( � 0 ) , are the basic equilibrium conditions throughout this chapter. 
19 About the treatment of international taxation in an integrated world, unified details are presented, for 
example, by Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991). 
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As a starting point of the analysis, we consider the sequence of tax rates as 
exogenous and examine its effects on investment levels. It is easy to see that, for all 
/ > 1, given ( j c f _ , , ) , (1) whenever x, > 0 , xf increases and x�decreases , relative to 
their no-barrier levels, and vice versa; and (2) xf is positively related to the tax rate t , 
but jc," is negatively related to x , , i.e. dxf Id-z, >0 but dx^! di, < 0 . The above 
results are natural because the tax is imposed on northern investment. 
In the following sections, {r,}二 will be considered endogenously as a policy instrument 
for various policy purposes with respect to GDP (or, equivalently, investment levels). 
By the analysis in Chapter 3，adjusting the barrier policy parameter {t,}二 can be 
regarded equivalently as adjusting the degree of asymmetric information problem. 
Thus, barrier policy is a candidate of policy instrument for various policy purposes. In 
particular, we adopt the barrier policy for the following purposes: (1) fixing southern 
investment target, (2) attaining a long-run GDP target, (3) inducing worldwide optimal 
path, and (4) precluding poverty trap. These analyses will be provided in the following 
sections respectively. 
4.2. Fixing southern investment target 
The simple barrier policy parameter {t,}二 can be used to attain a fixed target of 
southern investment level. In this section, we analyze how the policy parameter , 
for the purpose of targeting at a fixed southern investment level, should be set to an 
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appropriate magnitude. The resulted changes in dynamics are then examined. In 
addition, we characterize the properties of such a barrier and the restrictions associated 
with the policy target. 
As a starting point, we suppose the government of the South (or the North) set, in period 
0 before making financial contracts, a time-invarying target of southern investment level 
for some policy stabilization consideration. In other words, the government aims at 
xf = x^ for all / > 1, where 
x^ < min{jc, (1 - P )e [71 (x^) + 71 (x^ )]}. (4.3) 
Thus, the market-clearing condition for the world capital market (equation 2.22) is 
rewritten as 
x," = ( l - P ) e [ 7 i ( 4 ) + 7 i ( X o " ) ] - i \ (4.4) 
and x,:, = [(1 - p)971 ( j c ' ) - ] + (1 - p)dn(x；) f o r a l W > l . (4.5) 
Evidently, (1 - p)97r(jc^)-x"^ > 0 because x^ < x . The corresponding steady-state 
level of northern investment, denoted as x^*, must satisfy 
-(I-PPti ) = (l-^)dn(x')-x\ (4.6) 
The dynamic behavior of {义广}二 is shown in Figure 4.1 or equation (4.5). 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the dynamic behavior of ( x f , x^) for both the cases with and 
without the stabilization target policy. In Figure 4.2, given the initial investment level 
{XQ,XQ)，without the policy ， i s the point B and then (xf,x,") 
monotonically converge to the steady-state point C following the locus xf = | ^ ( x f ) . 
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With {t,}二 (defined below), (xf is the point D and then ( x严m o n o t o n i c a l l y 
converges to the steady-state point E along the vertical line given by xf = x^ . 
To achieve the above goal, the appropriate {i,}", should satisfy: 
(1 -T,)7r {x,)= �卩納 
71 (X ) + X 71 (X ) 
or ( 1 - t , K ( x , ) = t i ( * ” . 
Accordingly, we have: 
（4.7) 
where x广 solves the difference equations (4.4) and (4.5) given XQ and XQ . 
We now inspect the properties of such a fixing-southem-investment barrier sequence 
{t,}二 . Recalling that ”'(.）< 0 , 2 � w e have the following proposition, which provides 
the characterization based on the comparative statics results. 
Proposition 1: Suppose the southern investment level is stabilized at the target x^ by 
erecting an appropriate simple barrier policy {r,}二. (a) If x^ (which implies 
X厂 will increase as t increases), i.e. the world economy is developing, then the 
appropriate i , will decrease as the economy develops, (b) Given the northern 
See Appendix A for a proof. 
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investment level x广 in period t, the policy barrier is an increasing function of the target 
Proof: 
(a) [ 舶 ] 2 
(b) ！ ^ 寺 - 销 > 0 . • 
dx 71 (X,) 
For future reference, we state the steady state of x, , denoted as x *, here: 
* = 1 一 咖 ” (4.8) 
7 1 ' ( O � ) 
Finally, it should be noted that the target of the fixed southern investment level x^ is 
subject to a restriction, equation (4.3). It is because we want to ensure that the target x^ 
is feasible and a unique steady state exists.^' 
The above are the simple analysis of the stabilization policy on southern investment. 
The analysis of the same policy on northern investment can be conducted along the 
same line. More concretely, we can target at x^ = for all / > 1, where 
< min {3c, (l-p)e[7i ) + ti )]}, 
by erecting the policy parameter 
21 In the case of no steady state, x � m u s t converge to zero and then x^ will eventually not be feasible or 
supported. At the end, (xf ’x厂)converges to (3c,0). In the case of two steady states, the aforementioned 
problem may exist if the initial investment levels are not large enough. 
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, 1 71XX^) where x, = 1 Tl(xf) 
with xf being the solution for the following difference equations 
and =[(l — P)07r (x" ) -x" ] + (l—P)e7i(Jcf) for all ？ >1 . 
However, this fixing-northem-investment policy is considered to be not as important 
because of the impossibility of increasing both countries' steady-state investment levels 
(and thus GDP). The analysis of such possibility (or impossibility) will be explored in 
the following section. 
4.3. Possibility of the stabilization policy to improve both countries' steady states 
When there is a difference in the degree of asymmetric information across countries, the 
unfettered international capital mobility is not optimal in the worldwide sense.22 It 
implies that appropriate barrier to international capital mobility can be erected to 
improve the two countries' TOTAL steady-state levels of investment and thus the total 
GDP. However, the possibility of increasing BOTH countries' steady-state investment 
levels is still not ensured at this stage and deserves further study. In this section, we will 
explore such possibility (or impossibility) for both the fixing-southem-investment policy 
and the fixing-northem-investment policy introduced in the previous section. 
22 The worldwide optimal path will be derived in Section 4.5. 
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First of all, we explore the possibility of increasing both countries' steady-state 
investment levels by stabilizing southern investment level. Thus, one question is raised 
now: is it possible to stabilize southern investment level, xf to a target x^ such that 
a n d x 〜？ ^ ? 
To answer this question, we study the relationship between the steady-state level of 
southern investment and that of northern investment. To clear the world capital market, 
no matter what barrier policy sequence {x,}"^ , is erected, any possible steady state of 
must be on the locus satisfying 
(l-P)e[7r(jc^) + 7r ( y ) ] = + . (4.9) 
Equation (2.24) (the case of unfettered international capital mobility) and equation (4.6) 
(the case of stabilizing southern investment) are two particular cases of equation (4.9). 
The properties of such loci are discussed in Appendix B. 
To distinguish different cases, let us define x by 
(1-P)e7i'(3c) = l. (4.10) 
Under the assumptions of our framework, 3c is the investment level of a country that, in 
the steady state, maximizes the difference between that country's saving and investment. 
Evidently x < x . For convenience, also define x+ by the relation 
(l-p)e[7r(3c) + T c ( x " ) ] ^ x + x \ (4.11) 
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Then, if x"^  = jc, x^* = jc+ . In other words, x+ is a country's steady-state investment 
level when it receives the maximum possible level of capital inflows. Evidently, in the 
steady state, x^* < . 
By the property of ja(-) and the locus of equation (4.9)，we get that x^ < x . To be 
clear, it is useful to distinguish between two cases: x^ <x and x <x. 
Case 1: Suppose x^ < x holds. Then, the South is fairly poor in the no-barrier steady 
state and cbc^ Idx^ 1(4 9) >0 holds. In this situation, it is possible that the imposition of 
taxes by the South on income earned abroad would increase the quantity 
( 1 - p)67r ( jc^)- x^, relative to its no-barrier steady-state level. It is then immediate that 
the steady-state level of northern investment must rise; that is, > holds. 
Thus, if the southern steady state is originally poor enough, the erection of barrier to 
capital flows actually raises long-run GDP levels in each country. That is, production in 
the North is not adversely affected by the attempts of the South to discourage capital 
outflows. 
Moreover，in a steady state, these attempts actually increase the net outflow of capital 
from the South. Intuitively, the barrier to international capital mobility does encourage 
the southern residents to shift investment from the North to the South, other things 
equal. But, this increase in southern investment raises the level of southern savings as 
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well. With x^ < x , domestic saving increases by more than domestic investment in the 
South, and the net effect is that the South has a greater net outflow of capital in the 
presence of barriers to capital outflows than it does in their absence. Notice that this 
result illustrates an important possibility: barriers to capital mobility need not lessen the 
net magnitude of capital flows. 
Case 2: Suppose x < x , which implies /t/r^ |(4 9)<0 . In this case, setting 
x^ > x^ reduces the value (1- p)07i(jc^)-Jc^ , relative to its no-barrier steady-state 
level. Therefore, it must reduce the steady-state northern investment level. In other 
words, x^* < xN must obtain. Intuitively, when x < x , barriers to capital mobility 
must reduce net capital flows to the North. As a result, the steady-state northern 
investment level (and thus GDP level) must fall.24 
The above analysis is summarized as the following result. 
Proposition 2: For a possibility of stabilizing southern investment level xf to a target 
x^ such that both countries' steady-state investment levels (and thus GDP levels) are 
improved, that is, x^ > x^ and x^* > a necessary and sufficient condition is 
？ < 3c, where (1 - P)dnXx) ^ 1. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the case when x^ < x holds. By studying Figure 4.3, one is able 
not only to see the possibility of improving both countries by stabilizing southern 
23 A similar result is provided by Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000). 
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investment level, but also to investigate the appropriate range of southern investment 
target which is associated with such an improvement. To formally define the 
appropriate range of target, we recall that since x" g [x , ]，there are two solutions of 
in a steady-state equation 
given . Evidently, one solution is x"^. We denote the other solution as x^ . In the 
case of x'^  < 3c, it is clear that x^ is the smaller solution and x^ is the greater one. By 
studying Figure 4.3, we have: 
Proposition 3: Provided that jc^  < x , both countries' steady-state investment levels 
(and thus GDP levels) are improved by stabilizing southern investment at a target x^ if 
and only if jc^  < x"^  < x^ . 
Up to now, we have completed our analysis on the possibility of improving both 
countries' steady states for the fixing-southem-investment policy. In the following, we 
turn to analyze such a possibility for fixing-northem-investment policy instead. In other 
words, we raise another question: is it possible to stabilize northern, rather than 
southern, investment level x广 to a target x^ with > > such that xf would 
converge to a steady state greater than ？ 
24 A similar result is provided by Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000). 
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The analysis is more complicated than that for fixing-southem-investment policy. It is 
because with > > x" and the fact that x" > x , we must obtain two steady states 
satisfying 
(l-p)e7T ) 一 xS* = —（1 一 p )671 ) ， 
where denotes a steady-state level of southern investment corresponding to the 
northern investment target x^ Since jc+ > > x" , there exist two solutions for 
. We denote the high-level solution as xfj* and the low-level solution as xf*. 
Before proceeding our analysis, it should be noticed that, for the purpose of improving 
both countries' steady states, the condition x^ <x is still necessary for fixing-northem-
investment policy. The necessity of the condition is independent to the pattern of barrier 
policy {t,}", because {x,}^, does not enter the equation (4.9). However, the condition 
x^ <x is not sufficient for our fixing-northem-investment policy. More concretely, 
improving both countries' steady states by such a policy is not possible subject to some 
"reasonable" assumptions. Our explanation will be based on the following lemma. 
Lemma 3: Suppose that 
(1) there is a unique nontrivial steady state ( x � x " ) satisfying (2.23) and (2.24), 
(2) x^ <x holds, and 
(3) the initial state satisfies (1 - (3)9[ti (x^ )^ +7i (jc^')] ^ x ' + x " " . 
25 It may be helpful to refer to Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 for an illustration. 
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Then, for any northern investment target e [x"，x+], the resulted first-period value 
xf is less than xf*. 
Proof: With the target the dynamics of xf must satisfy 
Combine it with assumption (3) of this lemma, we obtain 
x f + 
Since x^ > x^ holds, we have 
x f < 7 . (L3.1) 
By the property of locus defined by equation (4.9), x^ <x implies 
dx^ I dx^ 1(4 9) > 0. Therefore, by assumption (2) of this lemma, it is obvious that 
7 < j c f . (L3.2) 
Combine (L3.1) and (L3.2), we obtain xf < xf*. • 
Lemma 3 has three assumptions. Assumption (1) makes the notation simpler, but 
releasing it would not alter the basic meaning of the Lemma. Assumption (2) is just the 
necessary condition for improving both countries' steady states. Assumption (3) means 
that, if no barrier is imposed, the unfettered world economy would be either developing 
(except for possibly the first period) or in the steady state. In particular, as long as both 
XQ and XQ are not greater than their unfettered steady-state levels, assumption (3) must 
be satisfied. As we are interested in issues about developing countries, we consider it as 
a "reasonable" assumption. 
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Figure 4.4 illustrates the dynamic behavior of 广） a n d Figure 4.5 illustrates the 
dynamic behavior of x f . According to Lemma 3，in the case of < x and if the 
relevant assumptions hold, xf is less than xf". Therefore, xf would monotonically 
converge to zero and then the target would no longer be feasible. At the end, the 
world economy would converge to a steady state (0, x) or point C in Figure 4.4. 
From the above results about fixing-northem-investment policy, we conclude the 
following: If the "original" steady-state level of southern investment x'^  is greater than 
X，improving both countries' steady states by stabilizing northern investment is 
impossible. Whereas if x^ is lower than x , fixing-northem-investment policy for 
improving long-run northern investment is eventually non-feasible subject to 
"reasonable" assumptions. We summarize those results in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: Suppose that, if no barrier is imposed, the unfettered world economy 
would (1) have a unique nontrivial steady state and (2) be either initially in steady-state 
equilibrium or developing at all dates (except for possibly the first period). Then, it is 
impossible to stabilize northern investment level to some target such that both countries 
enjoy a higher steady-state investment levels (and thus higher GDP levels). 
The intuition of the asymmetry between results for the two policies is as follows. The 
North-South difference in the extent of asymmetric information problem leads the South 
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to be originally poor than the North in steady state. As a result, for improving steady 
state, the required target for fixing-northem-investment policy must be higher than that 
for fixing-southem-investment policy. However, stabilizing northern investment level 
at such a high target requires the southern investment level to be so low that the South 
may fall into a poverty trap. Because the northern investment target is supported by 
capital flow from the South to the North, as the southern GDP converges to zero, the 
capital flow from the South would be no longer able to support the northern investment 
target. This makes the policy of targeting the northern investment futile. 
4.4. Time-invarying barrier for attaining long-run target 
In previous sections, we have introduced the use of investment stabilization policy and 
analyzed some relevant issues. By erecting the barrier appropriately in a certain period, 
the South can attain its GDP target level in the following periods. However, if the 
government is patient and just aims at attaining a target GDP in the long run, rather than 
attaining it in the next period, it can alternatively impose a weaker barrier policy, which 
we call a time-invarying barrier policy. In this section, we examine the resulted 
dynamics, appropriate magnitude and the required restriction of the time-invarying 
barrier policy. Besides, we explore the possibility of improving both countries' steady 
states for such a policy. In addition, a comparison between the time-invarying barrier 
policy and the fixing-southem-investment policy (examined in Section 4.2) is provided. 
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For concreteness, the government can aim at a certain steady-state target, denoted as 
(X � " ” where 
x P < � . (4.12) 
Of course, (jc^^^x"*) must be on the locus of equation (4.9) to clear the world capital 
market. Then, the government can erect a time-invarying barrier sequence, t , = t for 
all / > 1, such that the steady state ( x ^ * i s resulted. 
Before deriving the appropriate rate of the time-invarying barrier, we examine the 
associated dynamics when a time-invarying barrier i is levied. First of all, it should be 
noticed that equation (2.22) remains to be the market-clearing condition. In addition, 
since x, =T for all / > 1, the equation (4.2) is restated as 
(l-T)7rK)= s - ” (^f ) for all d (4.13) 
) + 7 I {X, )X, 
Since n "(•) < 0 holds, if there is a solution to equation (4.13), there exists a single-
valued continuously differentiable function such that equation (4.13) is equivalent to 
=cKxf). (4.14) 
Evidently, (])'(•) > 0 holds since < 0 and r|'(.) < 0. With a time-invarying barrier 
T，the equilibrium is described as a sequence {xf satisfying equations (4.14) and 
(2.22) given ( X Q , X Q ) (» 0). Also, we claim 




••• 71'[ |LI (jc)] = r | ( x ) a n d (1 _ T )7r '[小（x)] = r | ( x ) , \/x 
.'.Ti'[[iix)] = i\-Tyii'[<\>(x)l\fx 
. • .7 i ' [ |^ (x) ]<7r ' [ ( | ) (x ) ] ,Vxi f fT > 0 
.•.(t)(x)<|a(x),VxiffT > 0 (since7i"(.)<0) 
Other parts of the proof are just parallel. • 
Therefore, the erection of a time-invarying barrier shifts the integrated path down (up) 
from X厂=11 ( x f ) to jc广=(|)(x,) if T： > 0 (< 0) holds. The higher the magnitude of the 
barrier, the larger is the shifting. Meanwhile, the slope of the integrated path remains to 
be positive. The dynamics of (xf , x^) is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Given the initial state 
(XQ,XQ)，. without any barrier policy, (xf,;c广）is the point B and then ( x , , x , ) 
monotonically converges to the steady state point C following the locus x^ = i^(xf) in 
Figure 4.6. Meanwhile, with a time-invarying barrier policy T, (xf，XI") is the point D 
and then (xf, x,^) monotonically converges to the steady state point E following the 
locus jc," = (j) ( x f ) . If we restrict our consideration to the unique steady state case, it is 
easy to see that if jc^ " < x^，the integrated path should shift up, so x < 0 should hold. 
Whereas if x"^  < x*^ ^ < jc, the integrated path should shift down, so x > 0 . 
Since equation (4.13) must be satisfied in the steady state, the appropriate rate of the 
time-invarying barrier is 
T = i — J l l f ^ . (4.15) 
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By comparing equation (4.15) with equation (4.8) in Section 4.2, we can confirm that 
the appropriate rate of the time-invarying barrier policy is just the same as the steady-
state rate of fixing-southem-investment policy as long as the two policies share the same 
long-run target. 
Because the steady state must satisfy equation (4.9) in any case, the possibility of 
improving both countries' steady state GDP for the time-invarying barrier policy is 
essentially the same as that for the fixing-southem-investment policy. In particular, if 
the original southern steady state is poor enough, namely, in the case of < x , (where 
X is defined by equation (4.10) as in Section 4.3，）then both countries' steady-state 
GDP can be improved together by erection of the time-invarying barrier if the 
magnitude of the barrier is in a certain range. We use the same definition in Section 4.3 
to define x^ . In addition, we make the following definition for convenience: 
(4.16) 
n，(xN) 
As we have proposed in Section 4.3, in the case of x"^  < x , both countries' steady-state 
GDP levels would be improved by fixing-southem-investment policy if and only if the 
southern investment target belongs to interval • Similarly, for the time-
invarying barrier policy, if and only if the long-run southern investment target x^* 
belongs to interval both countries' steady-state GDP levels would be improved 
by the policy. To satisfy x^* the time-invarying barrier T must belongs to 
the interval (0,x). To summarize, we state the following proposition. 
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Proposition 5: In the case of x*^  < x , both countries' steady-state investment levels 
(and thus GDP levels) would be improved by erecting a time-invarying barrier policy, 
with the magnitude of barrier T e (0,f"). 
The intuition and interpretation of such a possibility for time-invarying barrier policy 
are essentially the same as those for the fixing-southem-investment policy: Although the 
time-invarying barrier encourage the southern residents to shift investment from the 
North to the South, but this increase in southern investment raises the southern saving 
level as well. If the southern steady state is originally poor enough, the erection of 
barrier increases southern saving by more than southern investment, and the net effect is 
that the South has a greater net capital outflow in the presence of the barrier policy. One 
can see Section 4.3 for more details about this issue. 
Hence, with respect to the possibility of improving both countries' steady state GDP, the 
time-invarying barrier policy and the fixing-southem-investment policy share a common 
property essentially. In the rest of this section, we will make a comparison between 
these two policy instruments with respect to two other aspects. 
The first aspect for the comparison is the associated restriction. Comparing with fixing-
southem-investment policy, time-invarying barrier policy is subject to a weaker (less 
restrictive) restriction on the southern investment target. Recall that the restriction for 
fixing-southem-investment policy is stated as equation (4.3)，whereas the restriction for 
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time-invarying barrier policy is stated as equation (4.12). There is no need to consider 
the feasibility of x"^ * for time-invarying barrier policy, that is, 
X � - P ) e [ 7 r ( 4 ) + 7r(XO,] 
is not required to hold. To see this, one can examine Figure 4.6 again. In Figure 4.6, we 
illustrate an example where > (1- |3)0 [TI (xf) + TT (XQ )]. It is easy to see that there is 
no problem of non-feasibility for such cases as illustrated in Figure 4.6. Intuitively, as 
the time-invarying barrier policy brings about a weaker control on the economy, it is 
subject to a weaker restriction. On the other hand, we still make a restriction for time-
invarying barrier policy, that is equation (4.12), for, again, precluding the multiple 
steady state case. 
The second aspect for the comparison is dynamics. Suppose that the restrictions for 
both policy instruments are fulfilled. Then we can compare the resulted dynamics of the 
two policy instruments with the common long-run target and the common initial state. 
In Figure 4.7，the resulted dynamics for a fixing-southem-investment policy and a time-
invarying barrier policy are illustrated in the same figure for comparison. In the 
example illustrated in Figure 4.7, the two policies lead {xf,x^) to converge to the same 
steady state (point D), which is the long-run target determined by government. 
However, the transitional dynamics are very different. With respect to the time-
invarying barrier policy, is point B (in Figure 4.7) in period 1 and then 
monotonically converges to point D along the locus x , With respect to the 
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fixing-southem-investment policy, (xf is point C in period 1 where is achieved 
and then x," monotonically moves up to point D along a vertical locus. 
From Figure 4.7，we see that northern investment levels in early development stages are 
always lower for the fixing-southem-investment policy than that for the time-invarying 
barrier policy. Intuitively, the fixing-southem-investment policy has a stronger control 
on the economy, namely, the stabilization of southern GDP. Such a stronger control 
results in a lower northern GDP as an expense, which may lead the North to be reluctant 
to erect the barrier policy, or retaliate the policy erected by the South. As to the time-
invarying barrier policy, the decreases in northern GDP levels in early development 
stages are moderate, but this policy lead to the target attained only in the long run and 
the southern GDP is not stabilized. For a framework with endogenous volatility, like 
the framework analyzed in Boyd and Smith (1997)，stabilization is an important 
concern. ^^  However, our framework does not contain a mechanism leading to 
endogenous volatility, therefore the importance of stabilization (which is an advantage 
of fixing-southem-investment policy) may not be directly seen in our framework. After 
all, the trade-off between time-invarying barrier policy and stabilization policy has been 
investigated by analyzing our framework. 
4.5. Inducing worldwide optimal path 
26 According to Espinsoa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000), time-invarying barrier policy cannot generally 
prevent the endogenous volatility in the framework analyzed in Boyd and Smith (1997). 
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As we have mentioned, the difference in the extent of asymmetric information problem 
distorts the allocation of funds in the world capital market. In this section, we will show 
that the simple barrier policy parameter sequence {T,}二，with appropriate magnitude, 
can be used to rectify the misallocation of funds in the world capital market. We will 
firstly derive the so-called worldwide optimal path (defined below). Then, we will, 
according to our result of such an optimal path, derive the appropriate magnitude of the 
policy sequence {x,}^, and examine its properties. Moreover, we will discuss the 
incentive compatibility of the worldwide optimal policy at the country level. 
Formally, we call an international allocation of funds as the worldwide optimal 
allocation if and only if under the resources and technology constraints, the worldwide 
aggregate output level is maximized through that allocation of funds. Once the 
worldwide aggregate output is maximized, so is the worldwide aggregate consumption, 
which measures the worldwide aggregate welfare. If is because the worldwide 
aggregate consumption just equals the worldwide aggregate output multiplied by p ？ 
We state the following three lemmas in order to characterize the worldwide optimal 
allocation of funds. 
Lemma 5: Given the investment levels in period t-\ (x二二,），worldwide aggregate 
output level in period t is maximized if and only if the two countries' investment levels 
in period t are equalized, that is, x , = x f . 
27 This will be explained later in Section 5.2. 
28 The proofs of the lemmas are given in Appendix C. 
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Lemma 6: Steady-state worldwide aggregate output level is maximized if and only if 
the steady-state levels of the two countries' investments are equalized, that is, 
x^ = x in the steady state. 
Lemma 7: Given the initial investment levels (x^, XQ ) � 0 , the present value of the 
worldwide aggregate output level is maximized if and only if (xf, x,") evolves along the 
unfettered integrated path without information asymmetry. 
Based on the lemmas, we call the 45° line in the plane (xf,x厂)as the worldwide 
optimal path because the international allocation of funds along such a path maximizes 
the worldwide aggregate output level, satisfying the resources and technology 
constraints. It should be noted that the worldwide optimal path is exactly the same as 
the unfettered integrated path in the case where both countries have no asymmetric 
information problem. This means that no intervention is needed for optimality if the 
market do not have any imperfection. Actually, lemma 5 is just an example of 
application of the First Welfare Theorem. 
Of course, the worldwide optimal path is also the same as the unfettered integrated path 
in the case of both countries share the same degree of information problem. This is just 
because, as we have mentioned in Chapter 3, it is the relative degree of asymmetric 
information problem rather than the absolute degree of that matters for the international 
allocation of funds. 
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We now investigate how the barrier policy parameter sequence {T,}二 can be set to 
induce the worldwide optimal path. Obviously, should be set such that the 
arbitrage condition (equation 4.2) and the worldwide output maximization condition 
(that is, X, = x f ) hold for all r >1. Therefore, we have 
7 r ( x , ) + x,7l (X , ) 
where ；c, = xf = x? for all / > 1. It follows that 
T, 二 ‘ ( 乂 � 三 0 ( x , ) for a l l / > l . ( 4 . 1 7 ) 
Evidently, 0<©(x, ) <1 holds for all x, > 0 . Therefore, the worldwide optimal path 
can be induced by erecting the barrier policy parameter sequence . Taking the 
market-clearing condition for the world capital market (equation 2.22) into account, the 
appropriate magnitude of the sequence {x,}^, is defined by equation (4.17) where 
X, = ( l _ p ) 9 冗 ( 而 ” • ^ 咖 ( 4 . 1 8 ) 
and X, = (1 - p )971 ) for all / > 2 . (4.19) 
given (Xo�Xo"). 
It should be noted that the worldwide optimal barrier x, in this section has a relationship 
with the asymmetric-information-equivalent subsidy a , defined by equation (3.8) in 
Chapter 3，namely, 
53 
( l - T , ) ( l + c j , ) = l for all / > 1 . 
This relationship just characterizes that the worldwide optimal barrier T, exactly offsets 
the effect of asymmetric information problem of the South, which is the source of non-
optimality. Accordingly, the dynamic behavior of (xf，xf) resulted from the worldwide 
optimal barrier policy is simply the same as that in the case where both the asymmetric 
information problem and barriers to international capital mobility are absent. As such 
dynamic behavior have been analyzed in Section 3.1 (particularly Figure 3.1), we do not 
repeat the analysis here. Instead, we simply highlight that the unique nontrivial globally 
stable steady-state equilibrium of the world economy is equal to the autarkic steady-state 
equilibrium (3c, 3c)，which implies that the steady state of the worldwide optimal barrier 
is equal to ©(x) . 
Now, we want to investigate the dynamic pattern of the worldwide optimal barrier. In 
particular, we want to know whether the worldwide optimal barrier would decrease as 
the world economy develops. Thus, we need to find the derivative of the function ©(•): 
d飞,=�）=x,71 {x, yjl \x,) + 71 (X, )7C \x,) - X, [71 \x, )f . (斗 ^Q) 
The sign of ck, I dx, derived in equation (4.20) is still ambiguous. However, we can 
sign it if the success probability function of risky project TIQ has a more specific 
functional form. In order to specify the functional form, we note that the function n (.) 
has a horizontal asymptote at unity. For this reason and for simplicity, we assume the 
form of rectangular hyperbola as the specific functional form of the function n (•). 
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Moreover, we can show that the only rectangular hyperbola that satisfies all the 
properties of the function n (•) takes the form 
•X n (x) = , where a > 0 is a constant. x + a 
By assuming rectangular hyperbola functional form of the success probability function 
71 (.), the worldwide optimal barrier x, becomes: 
a T , = . X, + la 
It follows that 
dx, (X, + 2a) 
Hence, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 6: Suppose the success probability function of risky project 7r(.) is a 
rectangular hyperbola, that is 7i(x) = + where a > 0 is a constant. Then the 
worldwide optimal barrier will decrease as the world economy develops. 
Finally, we will discuss the incentive compatibility of the worldwide optimal policy at 
the country level. By definition, the worldwide optimal barrier policy is of course, in a 
worldwide optimality sense, better than any other barrier policies. However, the 
worldwide optimal barrier policy cannot improve both countries' steady-state GDP. 
Indeed, unless the world economy would otherwise fall into a poverty trap, the erection 
of such an optimal policy would make the South improved but the North worse off. 
Thus, the North is reluctant to erect the policy and, if the South attempts to erect the 
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policy, the North may retaliate. Nevertheless, if international transfer payments are 
allowed, the optimal policy can still improve both countries' steady-state after-transfer 
(or disposable) GDP. Specifically, we need international transfer payments from 
developing countries to developed countries. Such required international transfer 
payments (for improving both countries) may be interpreted as a decrease in 
international aids from developed countries to developing countries provided that 
international aids exist originally. 
Finally, if the governments' central concern is their steady-state welfare rather than their 
steady-state GDP, we need to analyze the welfare effects rather than simply the effects 
on GDP. In fact, the analysis of welfare effects is more complicated than that of GDP, 
and we postpone it to Chapter 5. 
4.6. Precluding poverty trap 
As stated by Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001), multiple locally stable steady states and 
thus poverty trap are possible when there is a difference in the degree of asymmetric 
information across countries. As mentioned in Section 2.3, if the point (0, J ) in the 
plane (x严，x,") is a locally stable steady state, such a steady state is called a poverty 
trap. In this section, we study how the poverty trap, if emerge, can be surely precluded 
by a simple barrier to international capital mobility. 
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It is helpful to recall Figure 2.3，the point (0,3c) in the plane (xf, x^) is one of locally 
stable steady states. Obviously, changing the steady-state equilibrium from point (0,x) 
to any other point lying on the arc from (0, x) to (3c, x) will improve southern steady-
state GDP without decreasing northern steady-state GDP. This is the hint to adopt a 
barrier policy to preclude the poverty trap. 
One can easily see that the fixing-southem-investment policy introduced in Section 4.2 
and the worldwide optimal barrier policy introduced in Section 4.5 always preclude the 
poverty trap, but the time-invarying barrier policy does not. Thus, our focus is to find 
the right magnitude for the time-invarying barrier magnitude so as to preclude the 
poverty trap. Our answer is stated as the following proposition. 
Proposition 7: If a time-invarying barrier x with x > 1-r | (0)/7r ' (^) is erected, the 
poverty trap is precluded. 
Proof: 
Recall equation (4.13): 
( l -TK(;C , )=Ti (XF)， fora l l / > 1 . 
Therefore, � (O) = (7i')-丨 ^ ^ • 
[ L - T _ 
If x > i - M , 





1 - T 
(71')"' — < x , (since 71 "(•)<0) 
_ 1 - T 
therefore, 小(0) < J • 
Obviously, the poverty trap is precluded when (j) (0) < x . • 
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Chapter 5. Welfare 
In Chapter 4，we have introduced various policy instruments of simple barriers to 
international capital mobility. Moreover, the effects of the policy instruments on 
investment levels are analyzed. Actually, analyzing their qualitative effects on 
investment levels is equivalent to analyzing their qualitative effects on GDP levels. In 
particular, under the assumptions of our framework, the equilibrium GDP level of 
country i in period t (denoted as Y,') are expressed by 
}^'=ae7T:(x；), 
which is an increasing function of x;. Thus, there is no need, at this stage, to analyze 
the qualitative effects of the policy instruments on GDP levels. In this chapter, we will 
analyze the welfare effects qualitatively for the incentive compatibility analysis. Based 
upon the qualitative effects on investment levels in each country derived, it is 
convenient to begin the analysis by linking the welfare to investment levels. 
5.1. Welfare effects at the agent level 
First of all, we will analyze the welfare effects at the representative agent level. That is, 
we will examine the welfare effects for an agent in each country by asking whether he or 
she would be better off or worse off if a barrier policy is erected. 
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In our overlapping generation framework, each agent lives for only two periods. Their 
welfare is measured by their consumption in the old period. Therefore, when a barrier 
policy {xj^y. is proposed in period T-\ (before making financial contracts), only those 
agents bom in period T-l would care about the policy. Those agents bom in period 7-2 
would not care because the policy would not affect the investment levels and thus 
interest rates until period T when they would not be alive. Hence, for incentive 
compatibility, we only need to analyze the effects of the policy {T,}™ .^ on the welfare of 
those agents bom in period T-\. For this purpose, only the magnitude of T ” rather than 
the whole sequence {T,}二^^，is relevant. 
Analyzing welfare effects at the agent level is relatively simple. Whenever the policy 
parameter x .^ is positive, the southern investment levels Xj will increase but the 
northern investment level Xj will decrease relative to their no-barrier levels. It follows 
that the domestic interest rate in the South ( r / ) will drop, while the domestic interest 
rate in the North (r^ ) will rise. It is straightforward as the tax is considered to be 
imposed on northern investment. 
Without the consideration of the rebates of tax revenue, it can be inferred that northern 
entrepreneurs and southern lenders bom in period 7-1 will be worse off, whereas, 
northern lenders and southern entrepreneurs will be better off. In the following sections, 
we perform an analysis on the welfare effects at the country level where there are 
rebates of the tax revenue (as well as transfer between agents within a country). 
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5.2. Welfare effects at the country level: introduction 
With respect to a barrier policy {T,}"^, (proposed in period 7-1), we consider its effects 
on welfare in period T (next-period effects) as well as on the steady-state welfare 
(steady-state effects) in each country. The justifications, beside simplicity, are as 
follows. Firstly, the government of a country can be interpreted as an entity independent 
of the citizens of that country; and the government's objective in any period may be 
considered as maximizing the country's steady-state welfare. Secondly, the government 
of a country can be otherwise interpreted as an entity controlled by the citizens of that 
country; and the government's objective in any period is to maximize the total welfare 
of its citizens in that period. Finally, the government can also be interpreted as a mixed 
entity of the above two. In particular, the government of a country in any period 
maximizes the country's steady-state welfare subject to a constraint: that country's 
citizens in that period must agree on the government's policy decisions. As a result, we 
should analyze both the next-period and steady-state welfare effects for the incentive 
compatibility analysis at the country level. 
Since all agents consume only in their old period, we measure the welfare of a country 
in any period by the consumption of that country's old agents in that period. Since each 
country has two types of agents (that is, entrepreneurs and lenders), and different 
entrepreneurs may obtain different income and consumption, we use the utilitarianism 
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approach to summarize the welfare of different agents. That is, we use total 
consumption to measure a country's welfare. 
Recall that the labor share of the consumption-good output in any period will be lent to 
young entrepreneurs from young lenders (or labors) and will not be consumed in that 
period, whereas the capital share will be distributed to old agents (entrepreneurs and 
lenders) and consumed. Therefore, if country i is autarkic, its consumption level in 
period t is P7/ . 
We denote the consumption level of country i in period t as C] and we use superscripts 
of asterisks (*) to denote steady-state levels. Then, if the barrier policy is erected by the 
South and the tax revenue (and/or subsidy expenditure for encouraging capital inflows) 
is rebated to (and/or borne by) southern old agents as a lump sum, we have: 
= PaGTt (x；") - r^ a[jc；^ - (1 - P)971 )] , (5.1) 
and C^ = PaeTi (x;) + r ^a [(1 -(3)071 (5.2) 
and = pae7i(x"*)-r%t[y"*—(l-p)e7t(;c"^*)]， （5.3) 
and C ' ' = paGTt ) + r‘‘ a[(1 - p)971 (5.4) 
On the other hand, if the barrier policy is erected by the North and the tax revenue 
(and/or subsidy expenditure for encouraging capital inflows) is rebated to (and/or borne 
by) northern old agents as a lump sum, we have: 
C^ = paGTi(x^!) - 一（1 一 p)6冗(jc；".,)]， （5.5) 
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and Cj = PaBji{xj) + r/a[(1 - (3)971 (5.6) 
and C^* = PaBju - 产 - （ 1 一 p)971 ， （5.7) 
and = PaBTi ) + 产 a [(1 -(3)671 (5.8) 
An explanation of the setting of equation (5.1) through (5.8) is provided in Appendix D. 
We will analyze the welfare effects for the above two cases separately. 
5.3. Next-period welfare effects at the country level: the South erects the policy 
In this section, we will analyze the next-period welfare effects of a barrier policy 
(proposed in period 7-1) provided that the barrier policy is erected by the South. Given 
the initial investment levels , ), increasing a country's period T investment must 
be at the expense of decreasing the other country's period T investment. We raise a 
question: if a barrier policy is erected by the South, is it possible to increase southern 
investment x^ at the expense of northern investment Xj so that BOTH countries' 
citizens bom in period T-\ are better off? 
As a starting point, we rearrange equation (5.1) and use the fact that r广=9071 '{Xj). It 
follows that 
CV" -(1-P)e7i(x;_,)]}. (5.9) 
Given ，differentiating equation (5.9) with respect to x工,we have 
^ = -<xpe7i — (1 - p ) 9 7 1 ) ] . (5.10) axj 
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It follows from equation (5.10) that 
dCN > > — f = 0 i fx ,^=( l -p )e7r (x ;_ , ) . (5.11) ctXj < < 
Therefore, the relationship between the consumption level C工 and the investment level 
Xj (given ， ) can be illustrated as Figure 5.1. 
Similarly, we rearrange equation (5.2) and use the fact that r^ ) . It follows 
that 
Cl = a p e {tt (x^) -71 )[(1 - (3)971 ) - ]}. (5.12) 
Given and ，differentiating equation (5.12) with respect to Xj，we have 
祭 = a p e {TI ) -71 ) - n "{x^)[(1 - P ^n (x^,) - x � } • (5.13) 
From equation (5.13), it can be inferred that: if x^ > x � a n d x; < (1- p)67i ) , then 
dC^ / dx; > 0 . The relationship between C; and x^ (given x二 and ) can be 
illustrated as Figure 5.2. 
By investigating Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, we see that it is possible to increase southern 
investment level x ; at the expense of decreasing northern investment level x ; so that 
the citizens bom in period T-1 of BOTH countries are better off. 
As a particular case, suppose, with an unfettered international capital market, capital 
would originally slightly flows from the South to the North. Then the southern 
government can erect a barrier to discourage capital outflows as well as offer a subsidy 
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to encourage capital inflows so that capital would flow into (rather than flow out from) 
the South (only reducing the level of outflow is not enough). As a result, citizens of 
BOTH countries may better off so long as the southern investment level is still no 
greater than the northern level. That is described by the arrows in Figure 5.1 and Figure 
5.2. The following numerical examples demonstrate the possibility. 
Example 5.1: Let p = 0.5, 6 = 8, a = 0.5, and ti (x) = x/(x +1). Suppose originally 
international capital mobility is unfettered, and the initial investment levels are = 
0.8 and = |LI(0.8) = 1.2450. Then if no barrier is erected, the main economic 
variables in period r a re : 4 = 1.7673, x^ = 2.2288, 7 / = 2.5545, = 2.7611，C^ = 
1.2793, C^ = 1.3786, and the loan from the South to the North in period T would be 
0.0053. Otherwise, if the southern government erects a barrier to discourage capital 
outflows and offers a subsidy to encourage capital inflows such that the resulted Xj = 
0.1, then the variables in period T would instead be: Xj = 1.8518, Xj = 2.1442, 7 / = 
2.5974, = 2.7278, C^ = 1.2837, C !^ = 1.3789，and the loan from the South to the 
North in period T would be -0.0370. In this example, the barrier policy (including the 
subsidy) erected by the South i j =0 .1 improves the welfare of citizens bom in period 
T-\ of BOTH countries together. 
Example 5.2: Let the environment of the world economy is the same as that of Example 
5.1. Suppose that the southern government erects a worldwide optimal barrier policy in 
period T-\ (which maximize the aggregate welfare of the world). The policy parameter 
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(which includes barrier to capital outflows and subsidy to capital inflows) in period T is 
Ty, = 0.2501. Then we have in period T: x卜 x卜 1.9980, 7 / = Y^ = 2.6658, C^ = 
1.2839, C^ = 1.3819, and the loan from the South to the North in period T would be 
-0 .1101 . In this example, the worldwide optimal barrier policy erected by the South 
improves the welfare of citizens bom in period 7-1 of BOTH countries. 
5.4. Steady-state welfare effects at the country level: the South erects the policy 
In this section, we will analyze the steady-state welfare effects of a barrier policy {T,}"^. 
(proposed in period T-\) erected by the South. At this stage, we know that a barrier can 
improve both countries' steady-state GDP if the no-barrier steady state x"^  < 3c. But we 
do not know whether it is possible to improve the steady-state welfare of both countries 
together by a barrier policy erected by the South. To explore the possibility formally, 
we rearrange equation (5.3) and use the fact that r^* =6^71 . It follows that 
C"* = o c p e [ ( x , - 7 c ' ( ; c " * ) | > " * - ( l - p ) e 7 i ( ; c , ] } . (5.14) 
Differentiating equation (5.14) with respect to ，we have 
^ = a p e {-71 "(广 ) [ x " �(1 - p )671 (广)]+ (1 - p )9 [71'(广)]2} > 0. (5.15) ax 
Therefore, provided that the policy is imposed by the South, the qualitative effect on the 
steady-state northern consumption, , is the same as that on the steady-state northern 
level of investment, x^*. 
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Similarly, we rearrange equation (5.4) and use the fact that r^* = 6 ^ 7 1 • It follows 
that 
C* = a p e {TI ) + n Xx''*)[(1 - P )dn ) - ]}. (5.16) 
Totally differentiating equation (5.16) with respect to x^*, we have 
7 N* 、 知 = o c p e 71'(A：’ - 7 1 ) + (1 - P ) 6 7 1 ' ( X " > ' ( X � + 71 )知 [ ( 1 - P )671 (xS* ) - X"* ] dx [ dx 
(5.17) 
From equation (5.17), it can be inferred that: (1) if (which equals jc*^  if there is no 
barrier) belongs to the interval ( x , x ) , the total derivative dC^* /dx^* > 0 , hence the 
qualitative effect on C^* is the same as that on x^* ； and (2) if x^* < 3c holds, the 
relationship between the qualitative effect on C^* and that on x^* is ambiguous 
theoretically. 
Thus, although we previously show that if x^ < x holds, some barriers can increase 
both southern and northern steady-state investment, the condition is not sufficient (but 
necessary) to improve steady-state welfare of BOTH countries, if the policy is imposed 
by the South. However, increasing both countries' investment (which can be attained if 
x^ < x ) is often enough to increase both countries' consumption. After all, the 
following numerical example demonstrates the possibility of improving the steady-state 
welfare for both countries. 
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Example 5.3: Let (3 = 0.5, 6 = 8, a = 0.5, and n (x) = + 2.8). Suppose originally 
international capital mobility is unfettered, and the initial investment levels = 0.1 
and = 1^(0.1) = 1.2657. Then if no barrier is erected, the main economic variables 
in period Tare: x^ = 0.1085, x； = 1.2747, 7/ = 0.1492, V/ = 1.2513, C^ = 0.0845, 
C^ = 0.6157，and the loan from the South to the North in period T is 0.0147. In the 
steady state, we have: 0.2620, x"* = 1 . 4 3 6 7， = 0.3423，严* = 
1.3564, C^* = 0.1962，C '^ = 0.6532, and the loan from the South to the North in the 
steady state is 0.0401. It should be noted that in this example x^ < x = 0.5466. If the 
southern government erects a barrier to discourage, capital outflows and imposes a 
subsidy to encourage capital inflows such that x, = 0.1 for all t > T , then the variables 
in period T are: xg = 0.2130, x^f = 1.1702, 7 / = 2.2827, = 1.1790, C^ = 0.1147， 
C^ = 0.6162, and the loan from the South to the North in period T is -0.0375. In this 
example, the barrier policy (including the subsidy) adopted by the South improves the 
welfare of citizens bom in period T-\ of BOTH countries. Moreover, those variables in 
the steady state under the policy are: = 0.5492, = 1.5052, = 0.6559, Y"* = 
1.3985, C^* = 0.3602, C^* = 0.6670, and the loan from the South to the North in the 
steady state is 0.0534. Therefore, in this example, the barrier policy also improves the 
steady-state welfare of BOTH countries. 
5.5. Next-period welfare effects at the country level: the North erects the policy 
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In this section, we will analyze the next-period welfare effects of a barrier policy {t；,}:^ ^ 
(proposed in period T-\) provided that the barrier policy is erected by the North, rather 
than by the South. We mainly concern a question parallel with one in Section 5.3: if a 
barrier policy is erected by the North, is it possible to increase southern investment level 
Xj at the expense of decreasing northern investment Xj so that BOTH countries' 
citizens bom in period T-\ are better off? 
As in Section 5.3，we rearrange equation (5.5) and use the fact that r / =9pri(x^). It 
follows that 
CV" = ape { n { x ^ ) - (1 - (3)971 (x^,)]}. (5.18) 
Given x工丨，totaly differentiating equation (5.18) with respect to x^, we have 
^ = ape ^ '(^ r ) -^(^r ) +11 \ 4 " (1" P ^ 71 )]}. (5.19) 
So long as the international capital market is open in period T, the arbitrage condition 
(equation 4.2) implies 
> > 
71 '(^r ) - r | ( x^ ) = Oif and only if t � = 0 . (5.20) < < 
Let XjQ be the original level of northern investment in period T if the international 
capital market is unfettered. In other words, if x .^ = 0 , then n'{x^)=r\{x^) and 
Xj = x《o，where (1 - (5 )6 [tt ) + n )] = {x^^) + x^Q . Now suppose the North 
would absorb capital inflows if no barrier is imposed, that is, x f � - ( 1 - p)97t (x^_,)>0. 
76 
Then, when the North changes its investment level x^ by altering x^, the qualitative 
welfare effects would be 
祭 cOifx；^、"。， (5.21) 
Under the assumptions, the relationship between C广 and x工(given x二 ,， ) is 
depicted in Figure 5.3. 
Meanwhile, the barrier would also affect Xj and thus C j . To formally examine the 
effect on the period-r southern consumption C^, we rearrange equation (5.6) and use 
the fact that r / =_(>《）to derive 
Cj = ape {ti {xl) + 71 )[(1 - p )971 {xU) - ]}. (5.22) 
Given ，differentiating equation (5.22) with respect to x ; , we have 
祭 = a p e fr ' ( ^ r \ 4 ) [ ( 1 - P)071 (xf—丨)-X ]^}. (5.23) 
Therefore, so long as the international capital market is open in period T, we obtain 
ric^ 
^ > O i f x , ^ > ( l - p ) 0 7 r )， （5.24) 
since n '(x^ )>r\(x^) must hold. We illustrate the relationship between C; and x; 
(given X二丨，x!^—�) in Figure 5.4. 
From Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, we see that it is possible to increase southern 
investment x^ at the expense of northern investment x^ so that the citizens bom in 
period T-1 of BOTH countries are better off. 
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As a particular case, suppose the capital market is originally unfettered and capital 
would flow from the South to the North in period T. Then the northern government can 
impose a tax on foreign investment and transfer the tax revenue to its old citizens. As a 
result, citizens (bom in period 7-1) of BOTH countries may be better off. That is 
described by the arrows in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4. The following numerical example 
demonstrates such a possibility. 
Example 5.4: Let p = 0.5, 9 = 8, a = 0.5, and TI (x) = X/(X +1). Suppose originally 
international capital mobility is unfettered, and the initial investment levels are = 
1.5 and = |J.(1.5) = 1.9580. In period T, if no barrier is erected, we have: x^ = 
2.2904，x^ = 2.7573, 7 / = 2.7844, X广=2.9354, C'^  = 1.4077, C^ = 1.4522, and the 
loan from the South to the North is 0.0548. Otherwise, if the northern government 
imposes a tax on foreign investment such that x^ = 0.05, and transfer the tax revenue to 
northern old citizens, then the variables in period T would instead be: x; = 2.3384, x^ 
=2.7093, r / = 2.8018, = 2.9216, C^ = 1.4094，C; = 1.4523, and the loan from 
the South to the North is 0.0308. In this example, the barrier policy erected by the 
North = 0.05 improves the welfare of citizens born in period T-\ of BOTH countries. 
5.6. Steady-state welfare effects at the country level: the North erects the policy 
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In this section, we will analyze the steady-state welfare effects of a barrier policy {T,}:^ ^ 
(proposed in period 7-1) provided that the barrier policy is erected by the North. Our 
main concern is: is it possible to improve the steady-state welfare of both countries by a 
barrier policy erected by the North? To formally explore the possibility, we rearrange 
equation (5.7) and use the fact that 产=epr|(x'^*) to get 
(5.25) 
Totally differentiating equation (5.25) with respect to ，we have 
= 7r'(x"*)-7i(;cS*) + ( l - P ) e 7 r ' ( x " * ) n ( x � ) - i l V * ) ^[广 - ( 1 - ( 3如 ( 1 " * ) ] > ax y ax 
(5.26) 
So long as the international capital market is open in the steady state, the arbitrage 
condition (equation 4.2) implies 
> > 71 ) -TJ (x^*) = 0 if and only if T * = 0 . (5.27) 
< < 
Therefore, provided that the policy is imposed by the North, if originally x* > 0 and 
x^* (which equals ；c^  if there is no barrier) is smaller than x , then dC^* /dx^* > 0 . 
The qualitative effect on steady-state northern welfare, C^*, is the same as that on 
steady-state northern investment level, x^*. 
Similarly, we rearrange equation (5.8) and use the fact that 产=9pr|(x^*). It follows 
that 
C ' ' = a p e {TI ) + T i - p )971 ) - ]}. (5.28) 
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Differentiating equation (5.28) with respect to , we have 
dC^' . —IT = ape 71 '{x'') +11 )[(1 - P)971 ) - l ] + r i ) [ ( 1 — p)671 (x^ *) — ] . (5.29) ax , 
Suppose that < x , then n '(x^*) +”（x")[(l — p )971 '{x'*) 一 1] > 0. However, the RHS 
of equation (5.29) is still ambiguous in sign because r | ) [ ( 1 - (3)97x (x^*) -x^*] is 
negative. Therefore, we just claim that dC^* / dx^* > 0 if and only if 
71 )+r | (x '*)[( l -p)e7i '{x'' ) - l ] > - r | )[(1 — p )971 (5.30) 
In general, the condition (5.30) is more likely to hold if is smaller. 
In summary, if originally T* > 0, and x^ < x , together with condition (5.30) satisfied, 
then the northern government can erect a barrier policy to increase its steady-state 
investment. While the steady-state investment level in the South is increased, the 
steady-state welfare in BOTH countries would be improved. In many examples, 
increasing both investment levels is enough to increase both consumption levels. The 
following numerical example demonstrates such a possibility. 
Example 5.5: Let p = 0.5，0 = 8, a = 0.5, and 7i(x) = x/(x + 2.8). Suppose originally 
international capital mobility is unfettered, and the initial investment levels are = 
1.5 and = |a(1.5) = 2.7254. Then if no barrier is erected, the main economic 
variables in period T are computed: xf = 1 . 0 7 8 7，= 2.2897, r / = 1.1124, F广= 
1.7995, C^ = 0.6247, C^ = 0.8313，and the loan from the South to the North in period 
Tis 0.1583. In the steady state, we have: = 0.2620, x^' = = 1 . 4 3 6 7，= 
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0.3423, = 1.3564, = 0.1962, = 0.6532, and the loan from the South to the 
North in the steady state is 0.0401. It should be noted that in this example x^ < 3c = 
0.5466. If the northern government imposes a tax on investment from abroad such that 
T, = 0.05 for all t>T, and transfers the tax revenue to its old citizens, then x;= 
1.1428, x^ = 2.2256, 7 / = 1.1594, = 1 .7714，= 0.6329, C^ = 0.8325, and the 
loan from the South to the North in period T is 0.1263. Thus, the welfare of citizens 
bom in period 7-1 of BOTH countries are improved. Moreover, in the steady state, we 
get: ；c" = 0.4216, xN* = 1 . 4 9 2 9，= 0.5235, = 1.3911, = 0.2911, C^^ = 
0.6661，and the loan from the South to the North in the steady state is 0.0509. As a 
result, the barrier policy improves the steady-state welfare of BOTH countries too. 
Although the results in Section 5.3 through Section 5.6 may not be clear-cut for the 
issue of incentive compatibility in term of welfare at the country level, we can make 
some concluding remarks on the issue. Firstly, to discuss the qualitative next-period 
welfare effects, it may be useful to distinguish the issue into two cases: (1) If the 
magnitude of net capital flows is originally small, a barrier policy (including subsidy to 
capital inflows) erected by the SOUTH, such that the South would enjoy capital inflows, 
is likely to be incentive compatible, in term of welfare, at the country level. (2) If the 
South is originally a net lender to the North and the magnitude of the net capital flows is 
quite large, the barrier policy erected by the NORTH so as to reduce its investment to 
foreign countries, is likely to be incentive compatible. Secondly, the qualitative steady-
state welfare effects are often the same as those effects on the corresponding investment 
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levels. Thus, if jc^  < x , improving both countries' steady-state welfare by a barrier 
policy (either erected by the southern or northern government) is possible. 
Finally, suppose we aim at maximizing the two countries' total welfare and ignore the 
issue of incentive compatibility. Then the solution is to erect the worldwide optimal 
barriers introduced in Section 4.5. 
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Chapter 6. Epilogue 
In this epilogue, we summarize our main findings in this thesis and compare our 
findings with those in Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000). 
First of all, Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000) and this thesis are based on two 
similar but basically different frameworks. Namely, this thesis is based on the 
framework of Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001), whereas Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip 
(2000) is based on the framwork of Boyd and Smith (1997). The similarity of the two 
frameworks is that both adopt an "information-structure" approach to explain the 
perverse international capital flows and the non-convergence of per-capita income 
among countries. 
Because of the undesirability of unrestricted international capital mobility suggested by 
empirical facts, we conduct a policy analysis examining the consequences of simple 
barriers to the capital mobility. This thesis follows the approach of Espinosa-Vega, 
Smith and Yip (2000) to introduce taxation barriers into our framework. It should be 
reminded that the nature of the information asymmetry (which is crucial to explain the 
perverse phenomena) in our framework is different from that adopted in Espinosa-Vega, 
Smith and Yip (2000). We show in Chapter 3 that a country's information asymmetry 
can be regarded as a subsidy encouragement on investment abroad. It justifies the 
barriers to the capital mobility (which is "negative" subsidy) for rectifying the distortion 
of information asymmetry. 
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Both Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000) and this thesis conclude that appropriately 
selected barriers (fixing-southem-investment barriers) can stabilize southern 
(developing country's) GDP to a target in the immediate run. Espinosa-Vega, Smith 
and Yip (2000) showed that such stabilizing barriers would decrease over time as the 
world economy develop when some assumption is satisfied. In this thesis, we even 
show that the fixing-southem-investment barriers would be necessarily reduced during 
the development process. We further show that the required barrier is an increasing 
function of the southern GDP target. Once this barrier policy is erected, poverty trap is 
automatically precluded. On the other hand, both Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000) 
and this thesis conclude that the fixing-southem-investment barrier policy is possible to 
improve both countries' (southern and northern) long-run GDP. Moreover, we further 
conclude that if the stabilization policy is fixing northern GDP rather than southern 
GDP, improving both countries' long-run GDP becomes impossible under reasonable 
assumptions. 
In addition to the stabilizing barriers, time-invarying barriers also examined in both 
Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000) and this thesis. Both Espinosa-Vega, Smith and 
Yip (2000) and this thesis claim that, by erecting time-invarying barriers, a selected 
GDP target can attain in the long run. Furthermore, this thesis points out that erecting 
time-invarying barriers can also possibly improve all countries' long-run GDP (as if 
stabilizing southern GDP). The potential poverty trap can be precluded if the magnitude 
of time-invarying barriers is large enough. Besides, we present a comparison between 
85 
time-invarying barriers and fixing-southem-investment barriers in terms of their 
associated restrictions, control over the economy and the dynamics. Although time-
invarying barrier policy does not bring about stabilization, retaliation against the policy 
by other countries is believed to be less likely. 
Besides the stabilizing barriers and the time-invarying barriers, we also provide an 
examination of the so-called worldwide optimal barriers, which is not provided in 
Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000). By adopting the worldwide optimal barriers, the 
effects of information asymmetry are fully offset. Thus, poverty trap is automatically 
precluded and the output and welfare is maximized in the worldwide sense. We provide 
a technical condition under which the worldwide optimal barriers would reduce as the 
world economy develops. However, this type of barriers is harmful to northern long-run 
GDP unless the world would otherwise fall into a poverty trap. 
In our welfare analysis in Chapter 5, in addition to the steady-state welfare analysis, we 
have an analysis on the "next-period welfare effects" for the immediate run. It is, we 
claim, important to the issue of incentive compatibility but not investigated in Espinosa-
Vega, Smith and Yip (2000). We show that, for the barrier policy to be incentive 
compatible to all agents, different cases need different international cooperation. 
Specifically, if the magnitude of net capital flows is originally small, a barrier policy 
(including subsidy to capital inflows) erected by the SOUTH, such that the South would 
enjoy capital inflows, is likely to be incentive compatible to all agents. As another class 
of cases, if the South is originally a net lender to the North and the magnitude of the net 
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capital flows is quite large, a barrier policy erected by the NORTH so as to reduce its 
investment abroad, is likely to be incentive compatible. 
With respect to steady-state welfare, Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000) made some 
assumptions and then provided technical sufficient conditions under which all types of 
agents would be better off in the steady state. In contrast, we claim that for improving 
both countries' steady-state welfare, improving both countries' steady-state GDP is 
usually enough. 
Before the ending of this thesis, we have prepared a table for a comparison between our 
main findings with those of Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000). 
Table of results: a comparison with Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000) 
This thesis Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip 
(2000) 
Framework Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001) Boyd and Smith (1997) 
- In t e rna t iona l difference in the - costly state verification 
extent of information asymmetry problem with credit rationing 
- n o endogenous volatility - with endogenous volatility 
- capture “poverty trap” - no “poverty trap" 
Nature of Relative degree of information Not appropriate 
information asymmetry can be regarded as a 
asymmetry subsidy encouragement on 
investment abroad, (justify barrier 
policy) 
Stabilizing Barriers, if appropriately selected, Barriers, if appropriately 
southern (per- can stabilizing southern GDP to a selected, can eliminate short-
capita) GDP target in the immediate run. term economic volatility and 
- T h e higher the target, the larger stabilizing southern GDP to a 
the barriers required. target in the immediate run. 
|- The barriers must reduce over |- Barriers decrease over time 
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time as economies develop. as economies develop under 
- Always preclude poverty trap some assumptions. 
Can - Fixing southern GDP: possible - Fixing southern GDP: 
improving (since higher net capital flows possible (since higher net 
both may emerge) capital flows may emerge) 
countries' - Fixing northern GDP: - Fixing northern GDP: not 
long-run GDP impossible under reasonable provided 
by stabilizing situation 
policy? 
Time- By erecting time-invarying barriers, By erecting time-invarying 
invarying - can attain GDP target in the long barriers, 
barriers run - can attain GDP target in the 
- i m p r o v i n g both countries' long run 
steady-state GDP is possible - volatility is not generally 
- can preclude poverty if the prevented 
magnitude is large enough 
Compare with fixing-southem-GDP 
policy (the trade-off): 
- s u b j e c t to a weaker restriction 
- weaker control (i.e. no 
stabilization) 
- attaining target with moderate 
speed (retaliation less likely) 
Worldwide Can adopt barriers to fully offset Not provided 
optimal information asymmetry to attain 
barriers worldwide optimality 
- The barriers, under an 
assumption (71 (.) is rectangular 
hyperbola), reduce over time as 
economies develop 
- C a n n o t improve both countries' 
long-run GDP (unless the world 
would otherwise fall into 
poverty trap) 
- Always precluded poverty trap 
Next-period For incentive compatibility to all Not provided 
welfare agents, different cases need different 
effects international cooperation 
- ( 1 ) if magnitude of net capital 
flows is originally small, a 
barrier policy (including subsidy 
to capital inflows) erected by the 
SOUTH, such that the South 
would enjoy capital inflows, is 
likely to be incentive compatible 
to all agents 
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- ( 2 ) if the South is originally a 
net lender to the North and the 
magnitude of the net capital 
flows is quite large, a barrier 
policy erected by the NORTH so 
as to reduce its investment from 
abroad, is likely to be incentive 
compatible. 
Steady-state For improving both countries' - Assume the possibility of 
welfare steady-state welfare, improving both increasing both countries' 
effects countries' steady-state GDP is steady-state GDP by 
usually enough. barriers. 
- Assume tax proceeds are 
transferred to southern 
lenders. 
- Technical sufficient 
conditions are provided for 




r|'(jc) < 0 for all x > 0 . 
Proof: 
� _ {71 "(X)7I jx) + [71 \ x ) f } [71 (JC) + Xn X x ) ] - 7 T (jc)[7l '{x) +71 '{x) + XK "(JC)] 
” � = r / � �”|2 
[71 (X) + xn (X) ] 
_ n \x)[n ( x ) ]2 + xn "(x)7t '{X)K {x)+n (x)[7i 'ix)f + x[n X x t f 
一 [7r(X) + X 7 l ' � ] 2 
2n 0 ) [ 7 1 '{x)f + XTl "0)71 '(;c)7l (X) 
[71 (X) + xn '(X)]2 
71 "(X)[7I ix)f - 7 1 {x)[n '(X)]2 + X[TI '(x)]' 
[71 (X) + xn '(x)]2 
_ [71 '{x)f [X7t X 力 -71 (X)] +71 "(X)[7I {x)f 
< 0 f o r a l l x > 0 
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Appendix B 
We now trace out the locus defined by equation 
(1 - (3)e[71 ) + 71 {x'')] = x' (B.l) 
Firstly, the equation defines a continuous locus in the plane and each 
combination of autarkic steady states satisfies the equation. That is, the locus passes 
through the points (0,x) , (3c,0) and (x,3c) in the plane 
90 
In addition, the locus has a slope given by the expression 
dx' ( 1 - P ) 9 7 i V ) - 1 
Therefore dx^ / dx^ |(b ,)= - 1 holds at the point (x, x) . 
Now define x by (1 - (3)071'(3c) = 1. By Assumption 1, x < x (see Figure 2.1). By the 
concavity of n (.), 
(l-P)Qn '(x') > 1 if and only if jc' < x， i = S, N, 
and (1-P)e7x ' 0 ' ) < 1 if and only if x' >3c, i = S, N. 
Accordingly, dx" Idx' | ( B .丨 i f f ，;c") e[O，3^ ]x[3?，oo) or ,x ' ' ) g[x,cx))x[0,x]. 
Moreover, dx^ / dx^ I(B.I)=0 iff = 3c . Similarly, dx^ I dx^ I(B.I)=0 iff X " = X . 
Hence, when = 3c, jc^ is maximized; and when x^ = x , x^ is maximized. From the 
properties discussed above, the locus defined by equation (B.l) is looked like the arc in, 
for example, Figure 2.2 or Figure 4.3. 
Appendix C 
Proof of lemma 5: 
Recall that Y '； = K； =aen(x；) where Y； is the GDP level of country i. 
The maximization problem here is: 
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•X", X^f 
subject to x f =(l-p)e[7i(xf_,) + Tc(x,! , ) ] . 
The first-order conditions are: 
adn\xf)-X = 0, (C.l) 
= (C.2) 
where X is the Lagrangian multiplier. These first-order conditions imply: 
Since n"(.) < 0 , therefore: 
- r^ X, - . 
The first-order conditions (C.l) and (C.2) are necessary-and-sufficient conditions from 
the second-order condition: 
ae7i"(xf) 0 - 1 
0 a O n " ( x ^ ) - 1 = -KXOTI " ( x f ) - a O n " { x ? ) > 0 . 
- 1 - 1 0 
It completes the proof. • 
Proof of lemma 6: 
In the steady state, (1 一 P )9 [TT (JC;) + TI (X" )] = X^  + X" must hold. 
The maximization problem here is: 
Max ys + = a e [71 { x ' ) + n { x ' ' ) l 
subject to jc^  + = (1 - p )e [71 (jc勺 + 71 )]• 
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The first-order necessary conditions are: 
aOTt ) + X[(\ - ( 3 ) 9 7 1 ) -1 ] = 0， （C.3) 
aBTi '{x") + X[(\ 一 p )671 \xN ) - l ] = 0. (C.4) 
where X is the Lagrangian multiplier. 
The first-order conditions (C.3) and (C.4) imply: 
a B T i ) + ?l(1-(3)071 '{x')-X = 0, i = S,N, 
e7r'(x')[a+Ml-P)] =入，i = S,N, 
n ) = 71 ’(xN)= . 
Since n"(.) < 0, therefore: 
xS =xN. 
Hence, the constraint (capital market clearing condition) can be written as: 
(1 - P )e [71 ( y ) + 71 (X”] = X � � 
Therefore, 
xS =xN = � or ？ = jc" = 0. 
By assumption 1, J is positive, and hence = = 0 obviously does not give the 
maximum. 
The condition x^ = x is a sufficient condition if the following second-order 
condition holds: 
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OteTT \ x ) + M l — P "(J) 0 ( 1 - P ) e 7 l \ x ) 一 1 
0 aeTi"(x) + (3)071 "(x) (1-P)e7i'(3c) - 1 
( 1 - P ) e 7 r ' ( 3 c ) - 1 ( 1 - P ) e 7 r ' ( x ) - 1 0 
=—2e [ot + 入(1 - p )]k ''(jc)[(l - p )971 '(x) -1]2 
>0. 
It suffices to show that X is positive when first-order conditions hold. The first-order 
conditions (C.3) and (C.4) imply: 
a97iX3c) 
By assumption 1 and the concavity of n (•), it is obvious (see Figure 2.1) that 
(1- (3 )971 ' (x )< l . 
Thus, A is positive when first-order conditions hold. It completes the proof. • 
Proof of lemma 7: 
The maximization problem here is: 
, + S)- ' (F/ = + 5 ) - ' ae [K (x f ) + 71 (X；)], 
subject to + =(l-P)e[7r(xf)4-7r (x 广 ) ] f o r all t > 0， 
given XQ and x二, where 6 > 0 is the social discount rate. 
Set up the Lagrangian as follows: 
/=1 /=0 
where {入,}:, is the sequence of Lagrangian multiplier. The first-order conditions are: 
(1 + 6)- 'ae7i ' (x f ) + X,^,(1 - p)671 \xf )-X,=0 for all (C.6) 
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(1+6 )-'ae7i ' (x f ) + (1 - P )971 ) - \ = 0 for all t > \ . (C.7) 
for all? > 0 . (C.8) 
The first-order conditions (C.6) and (C.7) imply: 
71 '(x； )[(1 + 5 )-'ae + (1 - p )e ] = A., for all t>l, i = S,N . 
Therefore, 
71 = n '(x；) = ^ for all / > 1. 
Since n"(.) < 0, we obtain 
xf = x," for all / > 1. (C.9) 
Equations (C.8) and (C.9) describe the optimal path, which is the same of the unfettered 
integrated path without information asymmetry. • 
Appendix D 
A note on equation (5.1) through (5.8): 
The first terms in the RHS of equation (5.1) through (5.8) describe the "before-
adjustment" consumption levels in the two countries, which equals (5 times the 
corresponding GDP levels. The second terms are the appropriate adjustment associated 
with international interest payments. 
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Notice that for country i, its domestic demand for loanable funds in period T is o^+i , 
whereas its domestic supply of loanable funds in period T is ( l - a ) ( l - p)A:j.= 
(\-f>)K'j. = ot(1 - p)671 ( 4 ) . Hence, the quantity - ( 1 - ( 3 ) 0 7 r ) ] describes the 
northern capital inflows, whereas the quantity a [ ( l - ( 3 ) 0 7 T ) - X J ] describes the 
southern capital outflows (of course, the two quantities are the same). 
The tax revenue received by the government erecting the barriers is 
T , r ; a [ x ; - ( 1 - P ) e 7 r « , ) ] . 
Recalling that (1 = r^ ，the above expression can be rewritten as 
When the lump sum rebate of the tax revenue is neglected, the northern old citizens pay 
the total interests of r j a [ x ^ - ( 1 - (3)071 and the southern old citizens received 
the total interests of r/a[(1 -(3)971； 
Since then, one can easily verified that if the tax revenue is rebated to southern old 
agents (and hence consumed), equations (5.1) and (5.2) give the consumption levels of 
the North and the South respectively. Similarly, if the tax revenue is rebated to northern 
old agents (and hence consumed), equations (5.5) and (5.6) provide the consumption 
levels of the North and the South respectively. 
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The justifications of other corresponding equations for steady state levels of 
consumption (i.e. equations (5.3)，(5.4), (5.7) and (5.8)) just follow the above logic. 
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